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A Word Beforehand
The study before the reader is a contribution by three eminent
international experts in the spheres of federalism and constitu-
tional law to the understanding of a fundamental problem lying
ahead of our state. The study has been made on the encourage-
ment of Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica and with the
financial assistance of the governments of the three authors
respective states  Switzerland, Canada and the Federal Republic
of Germany.
The crisis in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has riveted the
attention of European politicians for quite a while. Even more so
after October 5, 2000. Since the former Serbian regime was top-
pled, the issue of survival of the common state of Serbia and
Montenegro has rapidly evolved from a negative to an affirma-
tive standpoint by European and other interested political actors.
In the meantime, the European Union, the Organisation for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of
Europe and the leading states of Europe and the world have
taken a positive attitude towards a federal solution to the crisis. A
series of statements, declarations and analyses in favour of pre-
serving the common state speak for the fact that, at the very least,
the stance of Europe and the world towards the survival of the
state has become diametrically opposed to that prevailing ten
years ago, when the then federation was in the state of internal
collapse. 
Just like then, international political actors now proceed
from their own, well-thought-out interests in addressing this
problem. Naturally, there is no argument about it, whatever
the stance a country or an organisation might have taken. This
time, the general attitude to the problem is in favour of the
idea of preserving and reforming the federation, and all those
in this country who advocate the federal solution can be polit-
ical satisfied. And vice versa, which is becoming increasingly
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clear from Montenegrin official views. Consequently, certain
political inertia has shifted the arguments in favour of the
common state from internal to external, predominately Euro-
pean reasons for preserving and restructuring the federation.
In a nutshell, the argument is as follows: If it is good for
Europe, than it is good for us, that is, Serbia and Montenegro
in their common state. 
Relevant analyses produced within European organisations,
including reports by specialised bodies of the Council of Europe
(the Venice Commission) and the OSCE (the Office for Democ-
ratic Institutions and Human Rights), are by nature expert analy-
ses, but their political framework has been determined by the
policy these organisations have pursued towards the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. However satisfied with them the local
advocates of the federation may be, it is necessary to take into
account that these documents, by the nature of things, will not go
into the underlying reasons for constituting a state, or a federa-
tion for that matter, since they have to stem from internal rela-
tions  economic, technological, communication, as well as
political, historical and social. 
The analysis offered by Fleiner, Watts and Schneider is not
only an expert study in the generic sense of the word, but also a
scientific analysis in a classic sense, meaning that it had no pre-
set political framework or a goal to adjust their arguments and
proofs to. This paper is based not only on systematically studied
materials and talks held with all relevant political actors in the
country, but also enormous academic reputation of the
authors, gained through decades-long research and pedagogical
work and expert engagement in solving delicate constitutional
and political problems of modern compound states - from
Canada and Switzerland to South Africa and Cyprus. The fact
that the authors supported in their conclusion a federal solu-
tion to the state crisis in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
conveyed their general position that federalism is indeed able to
offer an appropriate balance between unity and diversities,
equality and functionality, the principles of the rule of law and
political consensus. However, it is also the result of their princi-
pled and factual insight into the problem of relations between
Serbia and Montenegro. For that reason, the authors offered a
string of useful recommendations on mechanisms by which a
federal balance can be reached in the concrete case of a two-
member federation. 
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Today, when political interests and passions often hinder a
rational search for a way out of the crisis, in Montenegro in par-
ticular, the study, produced by the three probably greatest
experts in federalism, is priceless in providing for better under-
standing of the problem and a rational search for a way out of the
present-day, seemingly unbreakable, impasse. 
Slobodan Samardiæ
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Belgrade, January 28, 2002
1.  Introduction
1.1.  MANDATE 
At the request of President Kostunica, an expert group of three
members was invited to visit Yugoslavia to assess proposals for
the constitutional reorganization of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. The three members of the expert group were Prof.
Dr. Thomas Fleiner, Institut für Föderalismus, University of Fri-
bourg, Switzerland), Prof. Dr. Hans-Peter Schneider (Institut für
Föderalismsforschung, University of Hannover, Germany), and
Prof. Emeritus Ronald L. Watts (Institute of Intergovernmental
Relations, Queens University, Canada). Our work on this proj-
ect was made possible by the financial support of the Govern-
ments of Switzerland, Germany and Canada, but our assessment
has been based independently from the views of those govern-
ments.
1.2. TERMS OF REFERENCE
To visit Yugoslavia, meet with representatives of various
governments in order to gain insights into political orientations
within Serbia and Montenegro, assess the situation of constitu-
tional politics relating to the constitutional reorganization of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and identify possible solutions;
To analyse and assess official documents pertaining to the
constitutional reorganization of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, namely the Joint Platform of The Democratic
Opposition of Serbia (DOS) and the Together for Yugoslavia
Coalition, September 2001, and the Government of Montene-
gro Platform for talks with the Government of Serbia on new
relations between two states, December 2000, and also support-
ing documents and other unofficial proposals;
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On the basis of talking to political authorities and analysing
the documents outlining the proposals, and based on their own
international experience and expertise, to draw up from a profes-
sional and politically neutral point of view a report with their
findings, identification of criteria, assessment of the solutions
being offered by the political participants, and recommendations
on procedural and substantive issues, including possibly recom-
mendations for more favourable solutions of a democratic char-
acter;
To submit their report by 30 November 2001 to the President
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the governments of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Montenegro and Serbia. The
report will be made public in its entirety.
1.3. FACT-FINDING VISIT
The expert group visited the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
during the period 30 September to 5 October 2001. In Belgrade,
the group met with representatives of the Federal authorities:
President Vojislav Kostunica, Mr. Miroljub Labus (Minister of
Economic Welfare), Mr. Dragoljub Micunovic (Speaker of the
Chamber of Citizens), Mr. Serdja Bozovic (Speaker of the Cham-
ber of Republics), Mr. Savo Markovic, special advisor to the Fed-
eral Prime Minister, and Mr. Slobodan Samardzic, and Ms. Ljil-
jana Nedeljkovic (Advisors to President Kostunica). In Belgrade,
we also met with the Premier of Serbia, Mr Zoran Djindjic. In
Podgorica we met with Mr. Milo Djukanovic (President of Mon-
tenegro), Mr. Filip Vujanovic (Premer of Montenegro), Ms.
Vesna Perovic (Speaker ofthe Montenegrin Parliament), and
with a group representatives of the Together for Yugoslavia
Coalition, including Mr. Predrag Bulatovic (president of the
Socialist Peoples Party), Mr. Dragan Soc (President of the Peo-
ples Party), and Mr. Bozidar Bojovic (President of the Serbian
National Party). Throughout our visit we received full coopera-
tion and assistance from the authorities in all three governments.
During our visit a number of documents were made available
to us for consideration. These included the current Constitution
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (adopted in 1992 and subse-
quent amendments); the current Constitution of the Republic of
Serbia (adopted in 1990), and the current Constitution of the
Republic of Montenegro (adopted in 1992); the Joint Platform for
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Constitutional Restructuring of the FR of Yugoslavia prepared by
the Democratic Opposition of Serbia and the Montenegrin
Coalition Together for Yugoslavia, and adopted by the Federal
Government at its August 30, 2001 session; the Government of
Montenegro Platform for talks with the Government of Serbia on
new relations between two states (December 2000); The Basis of
Defining the New Relationship Between Montenegro and Serbia
(Government of Montenegro (August 1999); Constitutional
Reform in Serbia and Yugoslavia: proposals by an independent
group of experts (Lidija Basta Fleiner, Vlademir Djeric, Marijana
Pajvancic, Dragoljub Popovic, Zorica Radovic, and Slobodan
Samardzic) published by the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights,
2001, which includes Proposals for a New Constitution for Serbia,
a Proposal for the Federation of Montenegro and Serbia and an
alternative Proposal for the Union of Montenegro and Serbia; Pro-
posal for Constitutional Restructuring of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Vojislav Kostunica, January, 2001); The Union of Ser-
bia and Montenegro: Proposal for the Reconstruction of FRY
(Bosko Mijatovic, Dragoljub Popovic and Slobodan Samardzic),
Center for Liberal-Democratic Studies, Belgrade, 2000).
We have also had the benefit of reading the Interim Report on
the Constitutional Situation produced by a Venice Commission
delegation (19-20 October 2001)1 That delegation visited
Yugoslavia at the same time we were there, and in their interim
report their assessment of the constitutional situation has turned
out to be in many respects similar to ours. We took also into con-
sideration the Comments on the Draft Referendum Law on the
State Status of the Republic of Montenegro of the Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE, War-
saw, 5 November 2001
1.4. THE MAIN THRUST OF OUR REPORT
We found general agreement that the Constitution of the FRY
is widely contested and that in virtually all quarters there is
agreement upon the need for a restructuring of the federation.
The status quo is untenable. At present, in Montenegro only
three federal powers, defence, air traffic control and issuing of
passports are exercised effectively, and in Serbia there is consid-
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1 http://www.venice.coe.int/site/interface/francais.htm .
erable overlap between the powers of the Federal and Republi-
can levels.
Both the official proposals advanced for reform would
involve a major restructuring of the federation. That proposed
by the DOS and TFY coalition as a joint platform and adopted
by the Federal Government 30 August 2001, envisages a radical-
ly more decentralized federation than the present one. There
would be limited federal powers, mainly focussed on foreign
policy, defence, a single market, and transportation, a bicamer-
al federal legislature with parity for the Republics in the Cham-
ber of Member States, guarantees of basic rights and freedoms
of citizens and protection of special rights for national and eth-
nic minorities, a federal court and an ombudsman. The federa-
tion would remain a single international entity. That proposed
by the Government of Montenegro proposes a loose confederal
union between Montenegro and Serbia in which defence, for-
eign policy and securing the common market and currency
would be responsibilities of the Union, but the member states
would internationally be two independent states, and the func-
tion of the Union would be limited solely to coordination with
parity of the member states a feature of all the joint institutions
of the Union.
We have examined these proposals in the light of the histori-
cal, social, economic and political context, and the variety of
other unofficial proposals that were made available to us. We
have done so taking account of the following criteria: (1) the
requirements for good governance, (2) maintaining the rule of
law, (3) promoting democratic processes, (4) recognizing and
legitimizing internal diversity (5) facilitating economic develop-
ment and welfare, and (6) creating conditions facilitating mem-
bership in the European Union and Council of Europe. In the
light of these criteria and based on our experience of such institu-
tions elsewhere, in our view the official proposal of the Montene-
grin government for a Union of Montenegro and Serbia, unless
substantially modified along the lines of the unofficial alternative
proposal for a Union proposed by the Belgrade Centre for
Human Rights 2001, would be seriously deficient in terms of
many of the criteria and particularly in relation to effective gov-
ernance and to prospects for accession to European Union. The
official proposal of the DOS-TFY Coalition meets the criteria
better, but in our view requires a number of modifications both
to ensure effective governance and also to provide effective safe-
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guards for Montenegro as the very substantially smaller partner
in the federation.
One important theme running throughout our report is an
emphasis upon the importance both of democratic processes
seeking a widely based consensus and of legality during any
process of alteration if the solution is to have legitimacy both
internally and internationally. This means for example that
attempting to solve the future status of Montenegro by way of a
referendum alone would create serious problems in terms of both
legality and legitimacy. For legality and legitimacy, any change in
the status of Montenegro will require not only a referendum with-
in Montenegro, but also formal constitutional amendments of the
current constitutions of Montenegro and the FRY. Furthermore,
to be accepted as legitimate internationally, the referendum in
Montenegro will need to be based on a clear question and sup-
ported by a clear majority of its citizens. For the latter a majority
of those voting will be insufficient. There will need to be at least an
absolute majority of voters resident in Montenegro.
Constitutional uncertainty clearly undermines economic
development. Consequently we urge the authorities in all three
governments within Yugoslavia to work on the constitutional
restructuring immediately, with no further delay.
1.5. THE STRUCTURE OF OUR REPORT
Our report consists of six sections. Following the introduction,
section 2 deals with an analysis of the current situation of consti-
tutional politics in Yugoslavia. Section 3 examines the current
constitutional framework and the requirements of legality and
legitimacy in any process of change. In Section 4 we assess the
alternative official solutions which have been proposed, as well as
identifying useful elements from unofficial proposals. In Section
5 we set out the criteria employed in arriving at our recommen-
dations. Finally, in Section 6 we present 15 recommendations.
These recommendations are grouped under four headings: (1)
General Procedural Recommendations (Recommendations 1-5);
(2) Specific Procedural Recommendations applying to four pos-
sible general alternatives (Recommendations 6-9); (3) Substan-
tive Recommendations applying to four general alternatives
(Recommendations 10-14); (4) A concluding recommendation
on the urgent need for action (Recommendation 15).
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2. The Situation of Constitutional Politics 
2.1. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEMS
2.1.1. In General
The main problem arises from the fact that none of the consti-
tutions (federal constitution, and both republican constitutions)
is considered to be legitimate. But even more important is that
this puts the question of the state as such is at stake. Nobody
knows for sure in what state he or she will be living in the near
future, what will be the borderlines of that state, what will be the
government, and what shall be the democracy he or she will be
able to participate in. Passports and citizenship are at stake, as is
the currency and the customary right. What will be the taxes and
for what state will they be used? Citizens belonging to a minority
in a Republic may even fear, that all of a sudden they will be for-
eigners within their former home state and discriminated as for-
eigners with limited access to labour, property and democracy. 
But at stake is not only the future status of every individual as a
citizen, but also the procedures which will enable the population
and the leading politicians to find a way out of the stalemate.
Which political body or authority can legally or with legitimacy
initiate any procedure? Who should be the parties representing
whom in any negotiation? What authority can finally decide
what should be the legitimate procedure? 
All these open issues create an unbearable uncertainty for
every citizen, for possible investors, for donors, for neighbour
countries and for international organisations (such as the Coun-
cil of Europe and the European Union in which Yugoslavia is
seeking membership). This has a disastrous effect on the econo-
my, social welfare and security, and political stability. Every
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politician can misuse his or her position and at any time it is suit-
able for his or her interest question the legitimacy of an authori-
ty, procedure or even a democratic process. It is the responsibili-
ty of all politicians to seek as soon as possible the removal of this
uncertainty by achieving some consensus on the rules to be fol-
lowed in solving these issues.
2.1.2. Legal Problems in Particular
The problems to be decided in the case of the dissolution of the
federation, of a unilateral secession of Montenegro, of the estab-
lishment of a Union with confederal elements or of a reconstruc-
tion of the federation are innumerable. We simply list here some
of the problems, without addressing them in detail. In the fol-
lowing paragraphs we outline what we estimate to be the main
issues to be solved.
Does a unilateral right of secession based on the right of self-
determination exist according to international law? 
 Is the decision of the Badinter Commission still valid for
Montenegro?
 Has the Union proposal from Montenegro to be imple-
mented by decentralization from the top or by aggregating
units from the bottom after a consensual dissolution of
Yugoslavia followed by a consensus of the two independent
republics to create a Union. This would neglect the federal
constitution and create a union based on the right of self-
determination of Montenegro and of Serbia?
 What remains of the federal level in the case of unilateral
secession? 
 If Yugoslavia would be dissolved, who would be the succes-
sor for its assets and debts? 
 Or does the Federation just turn into a unitary state and
become absorbed by the constitution of Serbia?
How should a referendum be organised and implemented
according to traditional democratic rules: 
 What is a clear question? 
 How are suggestive questions avoided?
 What is a clear majority of the citizens according to Art. 2
of the Montenegrin Constitution?
 What is a fair democratic procedure?
 What is the position of the three states (Montenegro, Serbia
and the Federation) with regard to the referendum procedure? 
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 How is objective information provided to voters in a refer-
endum and how are equal voices provided to different pro-
ponents in the procedure?
 How is neutrality of the state in the referendum procedure
ensured? 
 Are authorities required to give bipartisan information to
voters? 
 What should be provided in a negotiated contract with
regard to the transition period? 
Under the Constitution of Montenegro:
 Is the referendum sufficient or only a mandatory initial step
to be followed by a formal amendment of the constitution?
 Does the wording citizens in Article 2 Constitution of
Montenegro suggest an absolute majority of the citizens
with voting rights?
 Art. 1 of the constitution of Montenegro: must it be changed
before, after, or at the same time as the referendum?
2.2. HOW COULD THE PROBLEMS BE SOLVED
In our opinion the existing legal and constitutional bases of the
Federation and of the Republics will have to be basically recon-
sidered in order to establish legitimacy with regard to the great
bulk of the society, to enable the country to join the Council of
Europe and the European Union, to implement human rights, to
protect minorities and to reconstruct the federal balance. 
The federal constitution basically lacks legitimacy for the fol-
lowing reasons:
 The constitution of the Republic of Serbia has never been
adapted to the new federal constitution;
 Art. 135 second paragraph of the Serbian constitution
enables the Republic in certain circumstances not to follow
federal obligations if it is against its basic interest.;2
 The amendments of the federal constitution, in particular the
presidential election and the election of the representatives of
the Republics have never been accepted by Montenegro;
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2 If acts of the agencies of the Federation or acts of the agencies of another repub-
lic, in contravention of the rights and duties it has under the Constitution of the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, violate the equality of the Republic of
Serbia or in any other way threaten its interests, without providing for compensa-
tion, the republic agencies shall issue acts to protect the interests of the Republic of
Serbia.
 Since 1997 the authorities of Montenegro have refused to
implement federal law within Montenegro.
 The constitution does not provide a clear division of powers
between the Republics and the Federation with the conse-
quence that the jurisdictions are overlapping.3
 The constitution has almost no means to implement the
protection of human and minority rights within the
Republics.
Not only on the federal level, but also on the Republican level
constitutional amendments are urgently needed. The Serbian
Constitution needs to be adapted to the federation, it needs to
guarantee human rights on the constitutional level4, to provide a
clear separation of powers, and to limit the presidential right to
establish an emergency situation, and to guarantee some basic
rights also in emergency situation. And finally it has to provide
consistency between the preamble (State of Serbian people and
other nations and minorities) and Article 1 (democratic state of
all citizens). 
Thus Yugoslavia will face difficult challenges in order establish
legitimate procedures for the reconstruction of the federation,
the establishment of a new confederation, or a dissolution of the
federation.
2.2.1.  Reconstruction of the Federation?
In our opinion the most obvious legal path to follow would be
to reconstruct the federation according to the amendment pro-
cedures provided in the Yugoslav Constitution of 1992. 
Two alternative procedures are possible. The new constitution
could be adopted according to the existing amendment proce-
dures provided in Art. 139 to 142. 
A second possibility would be to first amend the current con-
stitution under its amendment procedure in order to change the
amendment procedure to a new amendment procedure support-
ed by a consensus among the different stakeholders. Such a new
procedure might provide for the election of a constitution- mak-
ing assembly with special provisions respecting the interests of
the Republic of Montenegro and the minorities.
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3 Article 7: Competencies in foreign affairs and Article 77 (competencies of the fed-
eration.
Taking into account the controversies with regard to the legit-
imacy of the existing constitution and the fact that the current
members of parliament coming from Montenegro were elected
in an election which was boycotted by the governing party. The
second alternative has some appeal, but it may lengthen the
deliberations. 
2.2.2. Procedure for Establishment of a Union 
2.2.2.1. Status of the Proposed Union Treaty
The alternative of creating a Union is not an option that we
recommend (See Recommendation 11). However in the follow-
ing analyses we simply examine the legal procedural problems
linked to implementing such an alternative. The assessment of
the two substantive proposals for a Union solution (Montenegro
Platform and Expert Commission of Belgrade Centre of Human
Rights) will be analysed later in section 4 below.
According to the Montenegro Platform of 2000, the Union
would be created by an international treaty with two sovereign
members of the Union. Montenegro and Serbia will be interna-
tionally recognized states. Thus, the Union treaty would finally
become legally valid after ratification by the member states. As
the treaty of the European Union is a treaty of international law,
the Union treaty between Serbia and Montenegro would be con-
cluded similarly according to the international law.
Analysing the Union proposal of the Belgrade Centre for
Human Rights, the answer to the question, whether this would
be established by an international treaty that creates a confedera-
tion, or would be a very decentralized Union constitution
derived by decentralizing the existing federation is less obvious.
Although in his introduction to the proposal Mr. Popovic con-
siders the Union to be an international treaty5, there are several
elements, which suggest that it would be a further decentralized
constitution: 
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4 Art. 12: Freedoms and rights shall be exercised and duties fulfilled on the ground
of the Constitution, unless the Constitution provides that the conditions of exer-
cising specific freedoms and rights shall be spelled out by law. Thus, the manner
of exercising specific freedoms and rights may be determined by law if this is con-
sidered necessary for their exercise.
5 The two sovereign subjects conclude an act forming a union of states, and that
act is basically a treaty. No. 2 of the Proposal Explanation.
 Article 1 does not refer to the Republics as entities but to the
citizens of Montenegro and Serbia. 
 The Union Assembly has democratic legitimacy and the
Government is not accountable to the member states but to
the assembly (Art. 17). 
 Implementation of union statutes is vested in the Union
government, which can delegate this function either to the
republics or to a special agency. 
 The Union would be required not only to respect human
rights but also to protect human rights. This implies powers
to protect citizens against the will of their government and
to implement this decision against the will of a republic gov-
ernment. 
 The Union will dispose of a single armed force, and a com-
mon foreign policy, taxing power and single monetary area.
These elements point in favour of a constitution. However if
the international community recognizes both member states as
sovereign subjects in international law and conceives of the
Union as an international organization, then the union built on
the will of the member states each recognized internationally
might still be considered as based on an international treaty
somehow similar to the European Union, which has been con-
sidered by the constitutional court of Germany as a very specific
State-Community (Staatenver-bund).
2.2.2.2. The Parties in the Procedure and the Parties of the
Confederation
If the final purpose of the reconstruction of the federal balance
should turn out to be a Union treaty, the basic procedure to reg-
ulate such a reconstruction should again be the existing constitu-
tions. However, two different procedures may be possible: First
the dissolution of Yugoslavia by mutual secession and then the
conclusion of an international treaty by the sovereign members.
The disadvantage of such procedure is, that there will important
legal uncertainties for all citizens during the transition period. 
The second alternative, which is legally less clear, but would
probably provide more legitimacy, and probably less uncertainty,
would be to decide at the same time on the restoration of the sov-
ereignty of the Republics and on the treaty establishing the Union.
Thus, if there is a clear common will to conclude a Union Treaty,
the political authorities of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro
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should  based on their existing constitutions and employing
their amendment procedures  agree at the same time to proclaim
sovereignty and independence, and acceptance of the Union
treaty. This procedure should use the amendment procedures
provided in both constitutions, including Article 2 of the Consti-
tution of Montenegro with regard to the changing of the status of
the country, and Art. 133 of the Serbian Constitution.
In conclusion we think, nevertheless, that the difficulties of
either of the two alternative procedures will bring such enor-
mous uncertainty that a Union treaty as the final solution to
overcome the current stalemate should be avoided as an objec-
tive by all parties. 
2.2.3. The Dissolution of Yugoslavia
Should all the important stake holders reach a consensus that
Yugoslavia should be simply dissolved, the decision for the disso-
lution of Yugoslavia should be a common decision of the
Republics on the one hand and of the federal institutions on the
other. It should be decided by a procedure providing for the
amendment of the federal constitution and should also respect
the amendment procedures of the constitutions of the two
republics. However, such a decision can only be made after all
important elements for the transition from a federation to two
separate and independent republics will have been decided by
consensus. It might even be necessary to conclude simultaneous-
ly a treaty regulating all transitional matters with regard to the
legal consequences and, of course, including all issues of the
property, assets and debts of Yugoslavia and of the Republics.
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3.  Constitutional Framework and
Requirements 
3.1.  CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
3.1.1. Historical Development of the FRY
The FRY has existed since 1992. It was hastily established as a
successor federation of the former Yugoslavia. It is international-
ly recognised as a sovereign state member of the UN and succes-
sor to the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The
former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been reduced to a
rump federation, because the four Republics (Slovenia, Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia) which seceded from the
Federation, each established itself as an independent sovereign
state. In the brutal wars following the dissolution of Yugoslavia
thousands of people lost their lives, property and homes. 
Legally, the dissolution of former Yugoslavia was recognized
by the international community, following the advisory decisions
of the Badinter Arbitration Committee in 1992. This Committee
decided, that, if the essential organs of a federation are no longer
able to function, that state is in dissolution, and as a consequence
each federal unit might legally use its original right of unilateral
self-determination and establish a new sovereign state out of a
non-state situation. This unilateral right of self-determination
was limited, however, to the territory of a federated unit. It could
not be claimed by minorities which live within the territory of a
respective federal unit.
According to the Badinter committee6 the Republics as feder-
al units of a federal state which was no longer able to enforce its
unity had by international law the unilateral right, based on the
principle of self-determination, to form a new state according to
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international law. This right to establish a new sovereign state as
a subject of the international community, however was restrict-
ed to the Republics determined by the boundaries of the federa-
tion in dissolution. The internationally recognised right of self-
determination of the minorities within the territorial bound-
aries of the Republics is restricted to internal autonomy but it
does not give minorities the right to establish an independent
state. Thus according to the Badinter decisions only federal
Units of a federal state can, if the federal state is in disorder,
claim by international law the right to be reconstructed as sover-
eign states according to international law. In consequence only
the Federal state according to Badinter is  unlike a unitary state
 open for dissolution; and in this case only the federal units as
such have an original right of self-determination according to
international law. 
In 1992 the new Federation of Yugoslavia composed of the two
remaining Republics Serbia and Montenegro was established.
But the Albanian Minority in the district of Kosovo of the
Republic of Serbia (labeled an autonomous province according
to the Constitution of 1974), which boycotted the referendum
for the new constitution, continued to claim the right of self-
determination and hence the possibility of establishing an inde-
pendent state like the other four Republics. Kosovo enjoyed a
far-reaching autonomy as a province of Serbia according to the
Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of
1974. But its right to self-determination has not been recognised
by the international community. Nevertheless, the international
community did intervene in order to protect the Albanian
minority in Kosovo with the bombardment of Yugoslavia in
1999. Today Kosovo is under the administration of the United
Nations and its security is protected by NATO forces (KFOR)
supplemented by Russian troops. The territory of Kosovo is
administered by the United Nations according to resolution 1244
of the Security Council, which states:
10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance
of relevant international organizations, to establish an inter-
national civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an
interim administration for Kosovo under which the people
of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Feder-
al Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transition-
al administration while establishing and overseeing the
development of provisional democratic self-governing insti-
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tutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life
for all inhabitants of Kosovo.
Thus, the territory of the province of Kosovo is for the time
being excluded from any constitutional rearrangement relating
to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the Republic of Serbia.
This uncertainty puts an important burden on any authority
responsible for constitution-making. 
3.1.2. The Claim to the Right of Self-determination by
Montenegro
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) founded in 1992
consists of two Republics very different in geographical size and
population. Montenegro, the smaller partner in comparison to
Serbia, makes up about 1/15th of the population and of the size of
Serbia. In 1999 Montenegro contained 651,000 inhabitants, and
Serbia 9,978,000 inhabitants.7 According to the IMF Publication
on the internet, the GDP of Serbia was 21 Billion DM while that
of Montenegro was 1.5 Billion DM in 20018 which is a somehow
similar to the difference in population.
Since 1999 the Republic of Montenegro has claimed to have an
inalienable right of self-determination based on the historical
and centuries-old sovereignty and verified by the decisions of the
United Nations and by the Badinter commission. On this basis
the Government of Montenegro submitted in August 1999 a pro-
posal for a new relationship between Montenegro and Serbia. In
December 2000 this platform was modified by a new proposal for
two independent sovereign states of Serbia and Montenegro
united by a confederal Union.
According to this platform the Republic of Montenegro con-
tests the legitimacy of the Federation and its federal institu-
tions as well as its constitution. Citing the advisory decision of
the Badinter-Committee, Montenegro claims the right of
self-determination and thus the right to establish its own
Republic as did the other Republics of Slovenia, Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. While the Badinter
Court Committee decision applied to the Constitution of
29Constitutional Framework and Requirements 
7 Statistical Pocket Book 2001, (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Federal Statistical
Office) Belgrade 2001.
8 IMF Country Report No 01/176 October 2001 Federal republic of Yugoslavia
Table 7C Serbia: Republican Government Fiscal Operations 19972001 and Mon-
tenegro Republican Fiscal Operations 2000 2001. 
Yugoslavia of 1974, Montenegro makes its claim against the
constitution of the FRY of 1992, claiming to have an inalien-
able right to self-determination and that the Federation has
lost its legitimacy with regard to Montenegro because it did
not respect its basic rights. 
Although the Republic of Montenegro joined the revised FRY
in 1992 following a referendum supported by an overwhelming
majority of its citizens, its leaders advocating secession claim,
that the right given to all the Republics of former Yugoslavia
earlier by the Badinter arbitration committee is not exhausted
and continues to apply despite the subsequent referendum to
remain within the new federation and its functioning for nearly
10 years. Those making the claim:
 contest the democratic procedure of the referendum of
1992;
 and claim;
 that the citizens had been forced to vote for the new federa-
tion;
 that the Federation has been mal-functioning and 
 that it has discriminated against the junior partner. 
They also argue that due to a relatively independent Montene-
grin economic system and the adoption of the DM as official cur-
rency, the Republic of Montenegro has become de facto independ-
ent and that for this reason Montenegro cannot return to a more
integrated relationship within the federation. 
The unilateral adoption by a federal unit of the hard currency
of another country raises questions about its responsibility for a
share of the federal debt in the eyes of creditors. Elsewhere,
where secession has occurred, the allocation of a share of the
federal debt to successor states has always required contentious
negotiations.
Our committee is of the opinion that, although there are to
begin with very good arguments to contest the soundness of the
Badinter decision which in effect declassifies federal states inter-
nationally into second class unitary states, it is not necessary
for us to reconsider that decision. However, we hold unanimous-
ly, that, if the right of the Republics for self-determination exist-
ed after the decision based on the constitution of 1974 (old
Yugoslavia), this right was exhausted when the new Federal Con-
stitution was established later in 1992. 
With regard to the argument that there has been a de facto
partial secession and independence, this cannot be based on a
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unilateral right for self-determination. De facto illegal secession
cannot under international law support a legal right to self-
determination.9 Although some authorities argue that histori-
cally Montenegro was oppressed by the regime of Milosevic,
such a complaint has not been made with regard to the current
presidential regime. To the contrary, although the legitimacy of
the constitutional amendment for the presidential election in
July 2000 is deeply contested, the democratic legitimacy of the
new president has been based on his election by the voters of the
entire Federation, despite the recommendation of the Montene-
grin authorities to their citizens to boycott these elections. 
Montenegro did participate in the constitution-making
process for the constitution of the federation in 1992 and it
adopted this constitution with an overwhelming majority. Arti-
cle 1 of that constitution expressly states: Montenegro is the
member of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
Today, the government of Montenegro argues in particular
that the amendment of the FRY constitution passed in July 2000,
which changed the election procedure of the President of the
FRY from an election by the parliament into an election by the
people, had not been adopted by the legitimate delegates of
Montenegro and thus is invalid. (For the election of the mem-
bers of the federal parliament in 1997 the governing party in
Montenegro had recommended its citizens to boycott the feder-
al elections). Thus, the Montenegro government has contested
the legitimacy of the federal parliament and of any of its legal
acts. Consequently, the Montenegro government does not rec-
ognize the elected President of Yugoslavia nor the other federal
authorities.
During the war against Yugoslavia the government of Mon-
tenegro initiated its own legislation in order to develop within
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9 A right to secession only arises under the principle of self-determination of peo-
ples at international law where a people is governed as part of a colonial empire;
where a people is subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation; and
possibly where a people is denied any meaningful exercise of its right to self-
determination within the state of which it forms a part. In other circumstances,
peoples are expected to achieve self-determination within the framework of their
existing state. A state whose government represents the whole of the people or
peoples resident within its territory, on a basis of equality and without discrimina-
tion, and respects the principles of self-determination in its internal arrange-
ments, is entitled to maintain its territorial integrity under international law and
to have that territorial integrity recognized by other states. (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada: Reference Re the Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R.
217).
Montenegro de facto the necessary elements for independence
and sovereignty. It adopted its own currency (DM) and also cus-
toms tariffs. It also claims to have a more liberal economic sys-
tem and higher living standards than Serbia. Today defence and
air traffic control are the only authority actually exercised on the
territory of Montenegro by the federation. 
This policy towards Montenegros independence and its own
sovereignty has been enhanced by some actions of the interna-
tional community. Nevertheless, after the democratic presiden-
tial elections of October 5 2000, the international community did
not recognise Montenegro as an independent state. It has only
recognized the FRY as a sovereign member of the international
community.
Furthermore, Montenegro has in many respects continued de
facto to accept the authority of the federal government as legiti-
mate. For instance, Montenegro receives international grants
given to the FRY through the central bank of the FRY. Indeed,
the international community distributes its aid to Montenegro
according to a principle of 1/10th. All citizens, including all
authorities of Montenegro, use the FRY passport. The army, con-
tested as illegitimate, has recently been asked to protect citizens
in the territory of Montenegro after two persons were killed in
villages close to the border line of Kosovo. 
On the other hand, Montenegro has failed to transfer taxes and
income from the customs to the FRY. It imposes its own different
customs tariffs. Thus, the federal institutions such as administra-
tion, army and parliament are paid for only by the Serbian tax-
payer. 
3.2. CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
3.2.1. On the Federal Level
During the Milosevic regime Montenegro unilaterally broke
out of the financial unity of the FRY. It decided to adopt the Ger-
man Mark as the only acceptable currency in Montenegro, it set
up its own system of customs and tariffs and refused to con-
tribute to the expenditures of the FRY for services for the whole
country in particular for the payment of the administration and
the army. The unilateral adoption of a foreign currency was only
possible, because Montenegro as such was not liable for the debts
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of the FRY. Legally only the FRY was liable toward its interna-
tional creditors. Thus Montenegro for the time being does not
share the burden of the debts of the federation. 
Such a unilateral de-facto partial secession was a clear viola-
tion of the very principle of federal loyalty (Bundestreue
according to the constitutional theory in Germany). Thus today
it can only retroactively be justified as an act of resistance against
the totalitarian regime of Milosevic. 
In July 2000 Milosevic changed the system of the presidential
elections. However, the outcome of the elections provided an
unexpected result for many observers. The citizens of Serbia took
the chance offered to them and used their right to vote as a right
to resist the totalitarian regime, and elected the common candi-
date of the opposition, Vojislav Kostunica. Unlike some citizens
of Montenegro many did not boycott the elections but made use
of the offered opportunity in order to overthrow the regime.
Thus with a soft revolution the citizens of Serbia and Montene-
gro abolished the totalitarian regime by democratically electing a
new president. 
This was the beginning for a new democratic development in
the FRY and in Serbia. Today the FRY is the only internationally
recognised state and as such a sovereign bearer of rights and
duties with regard to the international community. The Mon-
tenegro government, however, does not recognise the presidency
of the FRY because in its view the elections were based on an ille-
gitimate amendment of the constitution. 
However, in our view, it would be absurd to declare the elec-
tions of the President of the FRY as illegal, because the only pos-
sible consequence would be reinstalling Milosevic. 
This political and legal deadlock therefore can only reasonably
be solved if both sides can overcome their preoccupation with
history and start to recognise that acts of the past and elections
considered by one of the parties as illegal or illegitimate were
only justified out of the right of resistance against a totalitarian
regime. The rule of law and democracy however can only be fully
restored, if, during the period of transition, all parties agree to
accept the illegal acts of the past as justified by the right of resist-
ance in order to establish a democratic future, and agree to
respect the existing constitutional structure as providing the
guidelines for the procedure to be followed in order to establish a
new legitimate political order. Thus, the procedure for solving
the conflict should be governed by the respective provisions of
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the current constitutions including all historical amendments.
We are aware, however, that the procedures for the amendment
of the constitutions might be considered illegitimate as they
favour the majority. Consequently, we are also of the opinion,
that in addition to employing the existing legal procedures the
major parties in the process should first reach a political consen-
sus and then implement it by following the existing legal proce-
dures for constitutional amendments. Positive legality has to be
complemented by political legitimacy.
3.2.2. At the Level of the Republics and in Particular Mon-
tenegro
Whatever the final solution, a new federation, a confederal
union or dissolution of the federation, a fundamental change of
the constitutional bases is not only needed on the federal level
but also on the level of the Republics. 
If there is to be a restructured federation, the Constitutions of
the Republics will have to be harmonised with the new concept
of the federation, which will change the division of powers, pro-
vide new federal organs, implement human rights and minority
rights, etc. The constitutions of the Republics will have to take
into account this new federal order for their own legitimacy. 
3.2.2.1. Top Down  Bottom up Procedure?
The crucial question however is, what should come first: the
federal or the republican constitution? There is no historical
model of a federation, which reconstructed its legitimacy by dis-
solution followed by a bottom up procedure. The Swiss and US
examples show clearly, that a top down procedure guarantees
more stability in the uncertain transition period than a bottom
up procedure. With regard to Yugoslavia the main challenge is
the issue of the state at the federal level and the claim of Mon-
tenegro to obtain international recognition. As soon as there is
consensus for a new federal arrangement, international credibili-
ty, and with it economical stability will enable the country, in-
cluding the Republics, to improve politically and economically.
Thus we are of the opinion, that all important controversial
issues should first be negotiated and settled at the federal level. 
With regard to the Constitution of Serbia one has to keep in
mind, that this constitution dates from 1990 and thus predates
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the current Constitution of the FRY. The Serbian Constitution
was promulgated under the old Yugoslav Constitution of 1974
and provided in Art. 135 the right of resistance against the misuse
of power within the old federation. Although our mandate does
not specifically ask us to analyze the Serbian constitution, we are
supportive of the outstanding proposals that the expert group of
the Centre of Human Rights in Belgrade has already submitted
for a new Serbian constitution. That proposal has also been
endorsed in its interim report by the Venice Commission as of
the highest quality and to be considered a model for other
constitutions. 
3.2.2.2. With Regard to Montenegro 
Art. 1 of the Constitution of Montenegro
With regard to the requirement of legality, Montenegro has to
respect Article 1 of its constitution, which declares Montenegro
to be part of the FRY. Thus any decision of Montenegro for
secession or for a confederal Union would require a change to
Article 1 of the constitution.10
Art. 2 of the Constitution of Montenegro
According to Article 2 of the constitution any change of its sta-
tus requires a previous referendum of the citizens. In our opinion
the wording citizens and the importance of the decision
require, as we shall explain later, at least an absolute majority of
the eligible voters. According to the Montenegrin constitution
the citizens must be asked in a referendum previous to the
changing of the constitution.11
Art. 117 to 119 Amendment of the Constitution of Montenegro
After the decision of the citizens by referendum, the Assem-
bly must follow the procedure for constitutional amendments.
A constitutional proposal needs a two-third majority. However,
as this is a significant amendment the procedure of Art. 119
should be followed. Under that article the Assembly has to be
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10 Article 1 STATE: Montenegro is a democratic, social and ecological state. Mon-
tenegro is a republic. Montenegro is the member of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.
11 There has been a certain ambiguity with regard to the English translation of this
provision. The published English translation does not contain the word previ-
ous. We have, however, been informed by the adviser to the Minister of Justice of
the Federal Government, that the correct original and valid text clearly requires a
previous referendum, that is previous to any decision amending the constitution.
Cp. Also Report of Venice commission No. 15 footnote 2.
dissolved and a new Assembly has to be convened within 90
days. This new Assembly then has to decide with a two-third
majority of all deputies.12
3.3. CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY
The making of a new constitution cannot be reduced to a sim-
ple technical process to be guided by constitutional experts. Con-
stitution-making is an eminently political process, which has to
unite through the process and its results the different controver-
sial political and cultural communities into one political com-
munity to be held together by a common state established by the
common constitution. 
To quote the authors of the Belgrade Centre of Human Rights
Centre proposal for a new Serbian constitution: A democratic
reconstitution of Serbia can be achieved only as a democratic
integration of a multicultural and multiethnic Serbia. This is why
the tradition of aspiration to the free state of the Serbian nation,
as well as the equality of all peoples inhabiting Serbia remains
equally decisive for the legitimacy of the Serbian polity and thus
its stability. The Proposal strongly advocates that the ethnocen-
tric principle of a majoritarian nation be abandoned as a founda-
tion of a given nation-state, in which the minorities would be
granted all rights. Accordingly the Proposal defines Serbia as a
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12 Article 117 PROPOSAL OF AMENDMENTS: A proposal to amend the Constitu-
tion may be submitted by at least 10.000 voters, by not less than 25 deputies, by
the President of the Republic and by the Prime Minister. A proposal to amend the
Constitution shall contain the provisions where amendments are requested and
an adequate explanation thereof. The Assembly shall decide on the proposal for
amending the Constitution by the two-third majority of votes of all of its deputies.
If the proposal to amend the Constitution should not be adopted, the same pro-
posal may not be submitted again before one year has elapsed from the day the
proposal was refused.
Article 118 AMENDMENTS: The Constitution shall be amended by the Con-
stitutional amendments. DRAFT The Assembly shall provide the draft of the
amendment to the Constitution. The Assembly shall decide on the amendment to
the Constitution by the two third majority of votes of all of its deputies.
Article 119 SIGNIFICANT AMENDMENTS AND A NEW CONSTITUTION:
If the proposal to amend the Constitution shall pertain to the provisions regulat-
ing the status of the country and the form of rule, if it restricts freedoms and right
or if the adoption of a new constitution is proposed, with the day of adoption of
the amendment to that effect the Assembly shall be dissolved and a new Assembly
convened within 90 days from the day such an amendment was adopted. The new
Assembly shall decide by a two-third majority of votes of all the deputies only on
those amendments to the Constitution which are contained in the adopted
amendment, i.e. the adopted amendment for the promulgation of the new consti-
tution.
multicultural democratic state of all the citizens and peoples liv-
ing in it.13
Our committee can only endorse these remarks. Not only the
Republic of Serbia, but also the Republic of Montenegro is a
multicultural state. Thus, the Federation as such will be a multi-
cultural state, not only defined by the Serbs and the Montene-
grins, but by several other ethnicities living within the bound-
aries of the Federation. Thus the principles identified by these
remarks are not only relevant for Serbia and Montenegro but for
the entire federation of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the Venice
Commission has suggested that parts of this draft for a Serbian
constitution are equally suitable as parts of a new Federal Con-
stitution.14
A new federal constitution should establish values, which are
common and which can integrate not only the Serbs and the
Montenegrins but also all other minorities living within the
boundaries of Yugoslavia. Taking into account this indispensable
and fundamental purpose of a multicultural state, the very fact,
that the situation of Kosovo remains uncertain, adds an almost
insurmountable obstacle to any constitution making process
within the rest of Yugoslavia. (Although our group has no man-
date with regard to Kosovo, it cannot simply ignore this essential
impediment for the constitution-making process). A common
state needs a common legitimacy based on common values
which can integrate the diversities within the common state. This
legitimacy can only be achieved, if the great bulk of the fragment-
ed constitution-making power (pouvoir constituant) can
advocate and be integrated by the common values. Those values
can only achieve such a result, if within the fragmented society all
the relevant diverse groups cooperate in establishing the com-
mon values. If important minorities have the feeling that the
constitution has been made against their basic interests, the fed-
eration will always in their eyes lack legitimacy. 
We have to be aware, that the need for legitimacy as the basis
for holding a society together, applies equally whether the solu-
tion involves a federation, a confederal union, or dissolution into
separate states. In each case the resultant states will contain not
37Constitutional Framework and Requirements 
13 Introductory remarks for the Proposal for a Serbian Constitution from Lidija
Basta Fleiner Director of the Independent Group of Experts, In Constitutional
Reform in Serbia and Yugoslavia, Proposals by an Independent Group of Experts,
Belgrade 2001 p. 12.
14 Report Venice Commission No. 39.
only Serbs and Montenegrins but also other minorities. Thus, it
seems that whatever solution is achieved, it will only obtain legit-
imacy, if the entire political process is inclusive and enables
reaching a consensus among the different communities.
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4.  Assessment of Solutions Being
Offered by Participants
4.1. PROPOSALS
4.1.1. Official Proposals
4.1.1.1. DOS / Together for Yugoslavia (September 2001)
The Coalition between the Democratic Opposition of Serbia
(DOS) and Together for Yugoslavia promulgated in September
2001 under the title Proceeding Points for a Joint Platform on
Constitutional Restructuring of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia proposals for a new constitutional order of the FRY. 
Based on the sovereign will of the citizens of Montenegro and
Serbia the new constitution should provide a durable and legiti-
mate foundation for their future coexistence in the common
state. Also, it seeks to establish a federal and democratic polity
and create conditions for the freedoms and rights of citizens to be
exercised, the protection of national minorities guaranteed and
for the two member states to be equal. The new constitutional
order should also create all prerequisites for the common state to
join regional and European integration processes.
The common state of Montenegro and Serbia would be based
on the following principles of legitimacy:
 the sovereign will of the citizens of Serbia and Montenegro, 
 the historic statehood tradition of Serbia and Montenegro, a 
 the century-old cultural, political and economic ties
between Montenegro and Serbia,
 the commitment of citizens to build their common state on
the principles of the rule of law, in which basic rights and
freedoms, along with the rights of national and ethnic com-
munities, shall be consistently protected and power limited
by legal principles and rules,
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 the commitment of Montenegro and Serbia to achieve full
international affirmation of both the common state and the
member states through the harmonised activity of the com-
mon state, which will also pave the way for its efficient
entry into the modern regional and European integration
trends.
The common state would have the form of a federation, com-
posed of two member states that would have the status of federal
units.
Proceeding from these principles of legitimacy, a viable consti-
tutional system of the common state is to be established for the
welfare and benefit of all its citizens.
The common state would be vested with the following pow-
ers: 1) guarantees for the basic rights and freedoms of citizens
and protection of special rights of national and ethnic commu-
nities; 2) a single foreign policy and the possibility provided for
by the Constitution that the member states can establish inter-
national cooperation on an individual basis; 3) a single defence
system and shared border control, with the parliamentary con-
trol of defence forces; 4) single market, customs, monetary and
foreign trade systems; 5) transportation and communications
in accordance with the defence system and international con-
ventions.
The proposed organs and institutions of the common state are:
 the Federal Assembly composed of two chambers: the
Chamber of Member States with an equal number of repre-
sentatives from the two federal units, and the Chamber of
Citizens composed of representatives of the citizens of the
common state. 
 the President of the Republic representing the common
state in the country and abroad. The President of the
Republic would be elected and recalled by the Federal
Assembly. The President of the Republic would be recalled
solely on the basis of the Federal Courts opinion that he/she
violated the Constitution.
 the Federal Government as the holder of executive power in
the common state. The Federal Government would be
composed of the Federal Prime Minister and ministers,
who cover the federal powers in their respective depart-
ments. 
 the Federal Court unifying the constitutional court opera-
tions and regular court functions. The Federal Court would
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exercise the constitutional review of constitutionality and
legality and decide on extraordinary legal instruments when
all legal instruments in the judicial systems of the member
states are exhausted. 
 the National Bank securing the functioning of a single mon-
etary system.
 an Ombudsperson protecting the basic rights of citizens and
the special rights of national and ethnic communities.
The powers of the common state would be divided into exclu-
sive and mixed powers. The exclusive powers would be the sole
responsibility of institutions of the common state. In the sphere
of mixed powers, the Federal Assembly would endorse the basic
elements of a system, while the Assemblies of the member states
would regulate specific matters further. In these cases, all deci-
sions would be implemented by executive and administrative
organs of the member states.
Exclusive federal powers would be as follows:
 foreign policy
 shared defence and border control 
 monetary system
 customs system
 the Law of Contracts and Torts, securities, court and
administrative proceedings.
Mixed federal powers would be:
 the basic rights and freedoms and the protection of national
and ethnic communities in accordance with international
standards
 property relations
 tax system
 banking system
 foreign trade system
 transportation and communications
 pension, property and personal insurance.
In the domain of their autonomous powers, the member state
could consensually govern the fields of mutual interest without
arbitration by organs of the common state.
Amendments to the constitutional provisions governing the
powers of the common state, the composition and election of
federal institutions would require consent from the member
states. Other constitutional amendments would require a
two-third majority of all representatives in both chambers of the
Federal Assembly.
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4.1.1.2. Government of Montenegro Proposal for a Union 2000
In December 2000 the Government of Montenegro presented
also a Platform for talks with the Government of Serbia on new
relations between two states. The main arguments and propos-
als have been advanced as follows:
On the grounds of the historical and centuries-old sovereignty
of Montenegro and the inalienable right of Montenegro to
self-determination verified by the decisions of the United
Nations and by the Badinter Commission and proclaimed by the
Montenegrin Constitution of 1992: The Citizens of Montenegro
decided to form a common state with Serbia  the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. The Citizens of Montenegro wanted and
expected FRY to be a democratic community of equal Republics
and equal citizens. Nevertheless, many abuses of the FRY institu-
tions and bodies occurred during its existence, which resulted in
undemocratic relations and gross violations of the constitutional
principles of equality of the Republics and citizens, at the expense
of Montenegro. 
Therefore, it is necessary to redefine the relations between
Montenegro and Serbia on a new basis. This relationship can
only be based on:
 the historical, state, national and cultural identity of the two
states and two peoples, as well as on the sovereign right of
citizens of both states to make decisions autonomously
regarding their destiny;
 the tasks of common interest to Montenegro and Serbia are
to be entrusted to the Union and to be conducted on an
equal footing and subjected to the same level of control;
 on that ground, Montenegro offers the Platform for talks on
a future Union, which should be based on a common inter-
est of both states, as well as on the historical and current
realities.
The starting point for a new Union of Montenegro and Serbia
lies in the inalienable right of the citizens to decide upon their
national and state destiny. This could be the only basis for deter-
mining the common interest of the Union of Montenegro and
Serbia. This would create conditions to overcome the obstacles in
their mutual relationship.
 Montenegro and Serbia would be independent and interna-
tionally recognized states.
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 The independence of Montenegro and Serbia would be
decided through a referendum of their citizens, who have
the sovereign right to determine the destiny of their state.
 Independent and internationally recognised Montenegro
and Serbia would constitute the Union of two states by ref-
erendum vote of their citizens.
Montenegro and Serbia would form a Union, aware of the
common interest and the utility of such association, building a
structure based on the principles and relations acceptable for
both.
 In this Union, the citizens, their associations, companies
and institutions would have a wide range of opportunities to
fulfil their needs and interests. 
 Montenegro and Serbia, independent from each other
regarding questions of national and state sovereignty, in ful-
filling the common interest should function without cen-
tralisation.
 For the Union of Serbia and Montenegro the only accept-
able concept, it is argued, is the one that has as the basis the
constitutional position of the states as genuine holders of
sovereignty, delegating part of their competences, those that
can effectively be carried out in the Union on an equal foot-
ing and in a rational manner.
The Union of Montenegro and Serbia should be based on the
following principles:
 the equality within the Union of states;
 each state conducting in a sovereign fashion all state affairs
within its competence;
 the Union carrying out only those activities entrusted to it;
 competences of the Union to be interpreted restrictively and
performed, as a rule, by bodies of the member states and
exceptionally by bodies of the Union;
 bodies of the Union constituted on the basis of the principle
of equality and consensual decision making;
 open society;
 respect of international standards, human rights and free-
doms including special minority rights;
 market economy with domination of private ownership and
private entrepreneurship;
 rule of law;
 constitutionality and legality of Montenegro and Serbia.
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The competences of the Union should be considerably nar-
rower than the present competences of the FRY in order to
minimise potential conflicts and to express the new character of
the Union. The Union would have only the following responsi-
bilities:
 defence and external security of the Union;
 foreign policy of the Union;
 securing a common market and a convertible currency.
The responsibilities under these competences of the Union
would be conducted through the Assembly of the Union, the
President of the Union and the Council of Ministers.
 The Assembly of the Union would have one House; its
members, the deputies, would be elected on a parity basis
within the framework of exclusive legislative competence of
the member states.
 The President of the Union would represent the Union,
would be elected or dismissed by the Assembly of the Union,
and be subject to prior agreement of the Assemblies of the
member states.
 The Council of Ministers of the Union shall perform the
assigned executive tasks within the competence of the
Union and shall include the President, the Vice-President
and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, and
Economic relations. The member-state, through its govern-
ment, would have the right to initiate a special protection
procedure regarding the acts from the competence of the
Council of Ministers.
In the sphere of economic relations the Union would have 1) a
common market, 2) a single customs area, 3) a common convert-
ible currency. Despite this common currency system each mem-
ber-state would have its own central bank. 
4.1.2.  Unofficial Proposals
4.1.2.1. Centre for Human Rights
An independent group of constitutional experts (Lidija Basta-
Fleiner, Vladimir Djeric, Marijana Pajvancic, Dragoljub Popovic,
Zorica Radovic, Slobodan Samardzic) presented together two
alternative constitutional proposals for the relations between
Montenegro and Serbia published by the Belgrade Centre for
Human Rights, 2001.
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The first, entitled Proposal for the Federation of Montenegro
and Serbia (pp 83 to 94), focused on providing legitimate foun-
dations for a reorganised federation. It aimed to respect and
express the multi-faceted complexity of the federation in a way
that would secure the loyalty of the political factors to the com-
mon state. The proposal differed from the existing constitution
of the FRY in emphasising the residual authority of the member
states and the principle of subsidiarity in the distribution of pow-
ers between the federation and the republics, in urging that fed-
eral legislation as far as possible take the form of framework laws
leaving implementation to republic governments, and in urging
direct cooperation between the two republics in their areas of
autonomous jurisdiction. It would limit federal jurisdiction to:
(1) the minimal powers without which a state could not func-
tion, and (2) those necessary for the FRY to qualify for joining
the various integration processes in Europe. It proposed a bicam-
eral Federal Parliament as an appropriate balance between the
federal and democratic principles, aiming at accommodating the
needs for political participation, member state equality, and deci-
sion-making effectiveness. A number of other mechanisms for
ensuring balance are proposed including alternation between the
two Republics in the election of the President and the federal
Prime Minister15, a parity rule in composition of the Federal
High Court of Justice, and the requirement of a two thirds
majority in both chambers for constitutional amendments. 
The alternative proposal is for the Union of Montenegro and
Serbia (pp 95-102). This confederal project for organising the
Union of Montenegro and Serbia proceeds from the basic prem-
ise that there are two sovereign subjects Montenegro and Serbia,
and that in both cases the exponents of sovereignty are the citi-
zens of the two Republics. Because of this, exercising their sover-
eign powers directly  not through their representatives  the cit-
izens decide on the formation of a union of states. 
The two sovereign subjects would conclude an act forming a
union of states, and that act is basically a treaty. The subjects
concluding the treaty must abide by it and this constitutive prin-
ciple must manifest itself especially in regard to the question of
constitutional revision, i.e. amendment of the confederal act. By
its nature, the confederal act bears the title of articles. Hence the
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15 We would note that although it has not been constitutionally required, it has been
a regular practice in Canada for over 50 years to alternate the major political lead-
ers between English-speaking and French-speaking individuals.
proposal that the constitution should be given the form and title
of the Articles of the Union.
From the standpoint of international law, the Articles of the
Union create a single subject, which is a member of international
organisations. This does not prevent Montenegro and Serbia
from individually seeking and gaining membership in those
international organisations, which allow and recognise that kind
of membership.
According to the proposal, the Union of Montenegro and Ser-
bia would have very limited powers. The powers of the Union
proceed from the Articles  they are powers transferred from the
two sovereignties. The Union has no original powers. The trans-
ferred powers, certainly, cannot be unilaterally returned to the
original status. This would require a legal revision of the Articles
of the Union.
The powers of the Union of Montenegro and Serbia would
cover the following four areas:
 the protection of human rights (1);
 national defence and frontier police (2);
 foreign policy and international relations (3);
 economic matters to secure a common market, internation-
al transport and the environment (4). 
While items (1) and (4) represent a sort of necessary unity for
any community looking forward to membership in the Euro-
pean Union in the foreseeable future, (2) and (3) emanate both
from the very form of the Articles of the Union and sheer ration-
ality in action and organisation  the latter particularly valid for
item (2).
The organisation of Confederal Government would be very
simple.
 A unicameral Union Assembly would have unequal repre-
sentation from the two Republics, which are widely dispro-
portionate in population, but would feature a special deci-
sion-making process by way of five-eighths majority vote,
ensuring for both confederal entities that a minority feeling
in either cannot possibly prevail at the union level.
 The second organ of authority would be the Union Govern-
ment, made up of four ministers, two from Montenegro and
two from Serbia. It would be a directorial head of state,
would act as such in international relations, and have a Pres-
ident, who would also be the President of the Confedera-
tion. The President, whose term of office would be one year,
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would be elected by the Union Government, from Mon-
tenegro and Serbia in turn; the same person could not be the
President twice in succession.
 The third body would be a Supreme Court of the Union,
made up of eight justices, four each from Montenegro and
Serbia.
The amendment of the Articles of the Union could only be
made in the same manner as it was concluded. The old civil law
idea of parallelism of forms for concluding and breaking a treaty
has manifested itself to a certain extent here.
4.1.2.2. Center for Liberal-Democratic Studies
In 2000, another group of constitutional experts from the Cen-
ter for Liberal-Democratic Studies (CLDS) in Belgrade (Bosko
Mijatovic, Dragoljub Popovic, Slobodan Samardzic) earlier pre-
sented similar proposals for the constitutional reconstruction of
FRY under the title The Union of Serbia and Montenegro.
This group recommended also a State Union between Mon-
tenegro and Serbia but as a minimal federation, based on the
following principles:
 minimal and efficient government;
 principle of subsidiarity;
 constitutional principle  balancing the federal principle
(equality of members) with the democratic principle (equal-
ity of citizens);
 principle of cooperation in the State Union:
 principle of the distribution of authority on the federal
level;
 democratic procedure of establishing the Federal Constitu-
tion.
These basic principles should fulfil two essential conditions:
equality of the member republics and functionality of the federal
state. The state union has no political purpose, unless both con-
ditions are fulfilled. The degree in which these conditions are ful-
filled can be observed and estimated only in the institutional
mechanism of the new constitution, which would operationalize
the basic principles. 
The fields of authority of the State Union would be:
 protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the
citizens (including the rights of ethnic [minority] groups
and communities;
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 international relations and foreign policy;
 national defence;
 bases of the economic system for protection of the common
market. 
The government system of the State Union would be based on
the principle of distribution of powers with the following institu-
tions: 
 The Federal Parliament consisting of two Councils (Council
of Republics, Council of Citizens) would be the main repre-
sentative and legislative body of the State Union. It would
pass laws and other federal decisions, control the federal
budget and the work of the Federal Government, elect the
Federal President (or remove him from office), and ratify
the international treaties.
 The President of the Republic would represent the State
Union in the country and abroad. His functions and duties
would be defined similarly to those enshrined in the present
constitution of the FRY.
 The Federal Government would be the major institution of
the executive power organised on the chancellor model. Its
main duty would be to establish and lead the domestic and
foreign policy, to initiate and to implement federal laws and
other decisions. In the process of performing its functions, it
would have to cooperate with the republic institutions of the
executive power.
 Judicial organs of the State Union would be the Federal
High Court and the Federal Constitutional Court. 
The authors of this proposal admitted that the realisation of
the idea of a minimal federation (model of common functions,
which is achievable under the existent social, economic and
political circumstances) organising the State Union of two parts
of unequal size, population and economic capacity, which want
to retain their important political and national autonomies, is an
extremely difficult task. 
4.2. ANALYSES OF THE OFFICIAL PROPOSALS
4.2.1. Analyses of Each Proposal
The DOSTFY proposal for a common state is based on
the concept of federalism. It recognises the existence of the two
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sovereign states, Montenegro and Serbia, respects their special
historic traditions and acknowledges on the other hand the
strong political, cultural, religious and economic ties between
them. The member states would have the status of federal
units, i.e. of republics, which are considered as able to achieve
full international affirmation through the harmonised activity
of the common state. The competence basis of the common
state comprising foreign policy, defence, customs, securities,
court administrative proceedings is quite small and is reduced
from the existing FRY constitution but sufficient for an effective
and functioning government on the federal level. One point that
needs clarification is the meaning of mixed federal powers. It
should be decided whether they are concurrent competences
or areas of framework legislation of the common state. The lat-
ter would seem more appropriate.
The Montenegro 2000 proposal (from the government of
Montenegro) for a Union of Montenegro and Serbia seems to
argue in favour of a very loose confederal system. Both states are
supposed to be independent from each other and internation-
ally recognized. The Union would be constituted only by refer-
endums of the citizens of the two separate states and vested with
transferred competences. Despite their differences in size, popu-
lation, and economic strength both states in the Union would
deal with each other on the basis of equality and consensual deci-
sion making. The few competences assigned to the union consist
only of matters of defence, foreign policy, and securing a com-
mon market and currency. The government of the union is
bound to decisions of the constituent states; their governments
would have the right to initiate a special protection procedure
with regard to acts of the Council of Ministers of the Union. But
in fact, this type of a Union is an extremely loose confedera-
tion, because its government would be too weak to function
properly and effectively. 
The two proposals published by the Belgrade Centre for
Human Rights in 2001 serve as useful complements and modi-
fications to these two official proposals. In general outline
their proposal for the Federation of Montenegro and Serbia
is rather similar to that of the DOS TFY coalition for a
restructured federation, but the proposals of the Centre for
Human Rights provide a useful emphasis on the need to
accommodate the complex interests within the FRY based on
principles of inclusiveness, balance and workable decision
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making. Given that the official DOS TFY proposals are set
forth in outline form, if it is decided to go in the direction of a
restructured federation, then during the process of fleshing out
the details the principles and suggestions set out in the Bel-
grade Centre for Human Rights proposal should be borne in
mind. 
The alternative proposal of the Belgrade Centre for Human
Rights for a Union of Montenegro and Serbia advances a
much more workable form of confederal union than that in the
official proposal of the Montenegro Government (2000) for a
very loose confederal arrangement. Indeed, the Centre for
Human Rights proposal recommends a confederation with
some federal features and elements. Thus, like the EU it would
be a hybrid of confederal and federal elements. It calls the new
state composed by Montenegro and Serbia as two sovereign
members also a Union, but the founding confederal act of this
union, based on bilateral decisions of the two peoples, is con-
ceived as a constitutional treaty (Articles of the Union) and
the Union itself would be the only recognised subject of interna-
tional law. Although this union might also have very limited
transferred powers, its competences could not be returned by
unilateral decisions of one of the member states. The Unions
Assembly is only a unicameral parliament. Most important for
the coherence of this Union is its competence for protecting
human and civil rights with the Supreme Court as a watchdog.
Similar to the Swiss model of a confederation this concept tries
to offer an acceptable balance between the principle of equality
and the principle of functionality.
The Center for Liberal-Democratic Studies proposal for a
State Union between Montenegro and Serbia is in fact based
on the concept of a minimal federation like that of the
DOSTFY official proposal and the first alternative advanced by
the Belgrade Center of Human Rights. The State Union would
have a constitution which allocates and attributes the powers
and functions to the federation and the two member states. The
Federal Parliament would consist of two Councils (one of the
republics and one of the citizens). A special Federal Constitu-
tional Court would be the guardian of human rights and the
rights of minorities. In many respects it is similar to the
DOSTFY proposal for a restructured federation, but this pro-
posal goes into more detail on many aspects and these are wor-
thy of consideration. 
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4.2.2. Comparison
Comparing the different concepts, it is quite clear that the offi-
cial proposal of the DOSTFY Coalition 2001, the first alterna-
tive proposed by the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights 2001,
and the proposal of the Center for Liberal Democratic Studies
2000, as well as the Proposal for the Constitutional Restructur-
ing of the Federal Republic by Vojislav Kostunica (January
2001), are all broadly similar in advocating a relatively more
decentralised federal constitution with a bicameral parliament
and a parliamentary executive system of government. They differ
in some details and in emphases. In filling out the official pro-
posals which are only in outline form, points raised in the unoffi-
cial proposals might well be carefully considered. We have done
so in our own recommendations (see recommendation 13). 
The alternative confederal union proposal of the Belgrade Cen-
tre for Human Rights 2001 is in fact a hybrid of confederal and
federal elements, a combination, that might well make it workable
in the event that it is decided, that agreement on a restructured
federal constitution cannot be reached. In contrast the proposal
Montenegro 2000 does not even meet the criteria of a function-
ing confederal system because of some contradictions in the con-
cept and other practical obstacles for efficient policies on both lev-
els of government. Furthermore, only the four more or less fed-
eral models guarantee the survival of the FRY as a sovereign state
in a very new constitutional environment and would fulfil the
requirements of the EU and the Council of Europe. 
4.2.3. Compatibility with Constitutional Background
The three proposals of DOSTFY and the two Centres
would be derived from the existing constitutions of the FRY,
Montenegro and Serbia. They would avoid unilateral actions and
would involve a procedure for adopting new constitutions which
would be based on the principle of legality and would create
democratic legitimacy. The Montenegro 2000 proposal would
lead to a dysfunctional Union and to the dissolution of the FRY
by an illegal unilateral referendum, which is not compatible with
the provisions governing a change of the status of the Republic in
Art. 2, para. 4, 118, 119 of the 1992 Constitution of Montenegro.
Following this proposal one would obtain neither legitimacy nor
a new working relationship between Montenegro and Serbia.  
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5.  Criteria for Recommendations
5.1. GOOD GOVERNANCE
5.1.1. The concept of good governance
Governance can be seen as the exercise of economic, political
and administrative authority to manage a countrys affairs at all
levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions
through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exer-
cise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their
differences. Good governance is, among other things, participa-
tory, transparent and accountable. It is also effective and equi-
table. And it promotes the rule of law. Good governance ensures
that political, social and economic priorities are based on broad
consensus in society and that the voices of the poorest and the
most vulnerable are heard in decision-making over the allocation
of development resources.
Governance has three legs: economic, political and administra-
tive. Economic governance includes decision-making processes
that affect a countrys economic activities and its relationships
with other economies. It clearly has major implications for equity,
poverty and quality of life. Political governance is the process of
decision-making to formulate policy. Administrative governance
is the system of policy implementation. Encompassing all three,
good governance defines the processes and structures that guide
political and socio-economic relationships. Governance encom-
passes the state, but it transcends the state by including the private
sector and civil society organisations. What constitutes the state is
widely debated. Here, the state is defined to include political and
public sector institutions. The primary interest lies in how effec-
tively the state serves the needs of its people. The private sector
covers private enterprises (manufacturing, trade, banking, coop-
eratives etc.) and the informal sector in the marketplace. 
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Civil society, lying between the individual and the state, com-
prises individuals and groups (organised or unorganised) inter-
acting socially, politically and economically, and regulated by
formal and informal rules and laws. Civil society organisations
are the host of associations around which society voluntarily
organises. They include trade unions; non-governmental organi-
sations; gender, language, cultural and religious groups; chari-
ties; business associations; social and sports clubs; cooperatives
and community development organisations; environmental
groups; professional associations; academic and policy institu-
tions; and media outlets. Political parties are also included,
although they straddle civil society and the state if they are repre-
sented in parliament.
5.1.2. Consequences for Governing Institutions in the FRY
The FRY institutions of governance in the three domains
(state, civil society and the private sector) must be designed to
contribute to sustainable human development by establishing
the political, legal, economic and social circumstances for pover-
ty reduction, job creation, environmental protection and the
advancement of women. Much has been written about the char-
acteristics of efficient government, successful businesses and
effective civil society organisations, but the characteristics of
good governance defined in societal terms remain elusive. What
are these characteristics?
 Participation  All men and women should have a voice in
decision-making, either directly or through legitimate inter-
mediate institutions that represent their interests. Such
broad participation is built on freedom of association and
speech, as well as capacities to participate constructively.
 Rule of law  Legal frameworks should be fair and enforced
impartially, particularly the laws on human rights.
 Transparency  Transparency is built on the free flow of
information. Processes, institutions and information are
directly accessible to those concerned with them, and
enough information is provided to understand and monitor
them. The freedom of mass media has to be guaranteed and
untouched by state authorities. 
 Responsiveness  Institutions and processes must try to serve
all stakeholders.
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 Consensus orientation  Good governance mediates differing
interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best
interests of the group and, where possible, on policies and
procedures.
 Equity  All men and women have opportunities to improve
or maintain their well-being.
 Effectiveness and efficiency  Processes and institutions pro-
duce results that meet needs while making the best use of
resources.
 Accountability  Decision-makers in government, the pri-
vate sector and civil society organisations are accountable to
the public, as well as to institutional stakeholders. 
 Strategic vision  Leaders and the public should have a broad
and long-term perspective on good governance and human
development, along with a sense of what is needed for such
development. There is also an understanding of the histori-
cal, cultural and social complexities in which that perspec-
tive is grounded.
Interrelated, these core characteristics are mutually reinforcing
and cannot stand alone. For example, accessible information
means more transparency, broader participation and more effec-
tive decision-making. Broad participation contributes both to
the exchange of information needed for effective decision-mak-
ing and for the legitimacy of those decisions. Legitimacy, in turn,
means effective implementation and encourages further partici-
pation. And responsive institutions must be transparent and
function according to the rule of law if they are to be equitable.
5.2. RULE OF LAW
5.2.1. Legality and Legitimacy for Transition
The principle of the rule of law is to have governments limited
by law, ruled by legal instruments, accountable to law, with the
protection of human rights enforceable by law. Procedures have
to be regulated by the respective constitutional rules, which have
to guarantee that they are respected by all political forces.
In the current constitutional conflicts with regard to the rela-
tionship of the Federal Republic with the Republics of Montenegro
and Serbia, almost all actors contest, at least partially, the legitima-
cy of some of these constitutions. Some contest the legitimacy of
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the federal constitution or of some of its amendments, some con-
test the legitimacy of the Serbian constitution, and some contest
the legitimacy of the constitution of Montenegro as part of a feder-
al republic which they claim does not legally exist. 
All these arguments contesting the legitimacy and the legality
of these constitutions and of some constitutional amendments
have some grounds for justification. Thus, if one were to take the
argument of the rule of law literally, there would be no constitu-
tion on the federal or the republic levels, which could pass a rigid
test of the rule of law. In consequence no political actors would
have a legal instrument limiting their political and legal power.
Anarchy would be the logical consequence. 
There is only one way out to avoid such anarchy: that is to
accept for the limited transitional period all existing constitu-
tions as bases for the necessary constitutional procedures. A legal
acceptance now of all these constitutions without contesting
their partial or total legitimacy, seems to us to be the only way
out of the deadlock. This would provide a starting point to
achieve the very principle of the rule of law limiting governments
by law and preventing anarchy. 
Acceptance by all of the legality of the current legal instru-
ments as basic laws for proceeding towards finding a necessary
consensus (rather than arguing about their legitimacy) would
enable progress towards reaching an eventual reconciliation of
conflicting views. We find support for such a process in the sub-
mitted doctoral theses of Maya Hertig16, who has examined the
dissolution process of the Federal Republic of Czechoslovakia.
She came to the conclusion that the major reason this dissolution
process could be agreed upon by peaceful and non-violent proce-
dures, was to be found in the fact, that although all the actors
contested the legitimacy of the constitution, they agreed to
accept its legality, at least for the transitional period, in order to
enable negotiations to proceed. 
5.2.2. With Regard to the New Constitutional Arrangements
Whatever constitutional arrangements are eventually agreed
upon, they must implement the very principles of the rule of law.
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16 Cf. Maya Hertig, Die Auflösung der Tschechoslowakei: Analyse einer friedlichen
Staatsteilung, Diss Freiburg 2001.
Referendums and majority principles cannot overrule the rule
of law. Governmental action must also be limited by law. 
In our report we will only refer to the rule of law as far as it has
special implications for a federal or confederal solution: in the
case of a federal constitution, the constituent Republics must also
be limited by rule of law. Thus, a federation or a confederation
should provide a common court which can guarantee that acts of
the republics in conflict with the federation or the confederation
can be over-ruled and that federal or confederal law has
supremacy over the domestic law of member states as, for exam-
ple, in the European Union. It should include mechanisms and
processes to guarantee peaceful conflict management between
Republic and federal or confederal (union) governments. The
rule of law also means that the constitutional arrangements have
to guarantee that human rights are effectively protected with
regard to minorities within the Republics. 
5.3.  DEMOCRACY
5.3.1. The Referendum in Montenegro
On October 10 (after our visit to Yugoslavia) a draft Referen-
dum Law on the State Status of the Republic of Montenegro was
submitted as lex specialis to the already existing Referendum
Law, which had been adopted on 19 February 2001. The follow-
ing remarks take into account this new amendment and in par-
ticular the comments which have been made by the ODHIR of
the OSCE17
With regard to the principle of democracy, in addition we refer
to the report of the Venice Commission as well as to the Com-
ments of the ODIHR, and give some additional general consider-
ations with regard to democratic procedures for secessions. With
regard to the proposed referendum in Montenegro the following
issues are controversial:
 What is the impact of the Referendum?
 What majority is required in the referendum?
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17 Comments on the Draft Referendum Law on the State Status of the republic of
Montenegro Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, OSCE Office for Democratic Insti-
tutions and Human Rights Warsaw November 2, 2001.
 Should Montenegrins living outside Montenegro in Serbia
or even outside Yugoslavia have the right to vote?
 What should be the question to be asked in the referendum?
 Finally taking into account the Swiss experience with regard
to these kinds of referendums should there also be some
guarantees in the procedure ensuring that a clear will of the
citizens is determined?
Most of these issues have already been addressed by the Venice
Commission. Its conclusions were as follows:
 It would be advisable to introduce a specific majority
requirement into the referendum law for referendums on
the status of the country; 18
 In the case of a positive result, a referendum on independ-
ence would have to be confirmed by a two-thirds majority of
the Assembly of Montenegro;
 It is in full accordance with international standards that the
referendum law requires that voters must have residence in
Montenegro.19
As in principle we share the arguments and the conclusions of
the Venice Commission we will only develop some additional
comments.
5.3.1.1. A Clear Majority
Article 2 of the constitution of Montenegro provides, that for
any change of the status of the Republic the citizens should be
asked previously to determine their will in a referendum.
According to its wording the will of the citizens can only be rep-
resented by a majority of the citizens making the decision. Arti-
cle 2 of the constitution contains a procedure for initiating a
change of the status of the Republic. Such a fundamental status
can only be changed if it is decided by a clear majority. The
Montenegrin Law on Referendum, which is still in force, does
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18 Comments also of the ODIHR: ODIHR urged in paragraph III B of the Assess-
ment of 6 July, that some qualified or weighted majority should be introduced for
a referendum result to be valid: International law and the OSCE commitments
contained in the Copenhagen Document include no standards on the issue. How-
ever, best international practice in conducting referendums in similar situations
inform us that some level of weighted or qualified majority is preferable in order
for the outcome of a referendum to be less contestable and stability safeguarded.
Furthermore, a qualified majority requirement reduces the potential for repetitive
referendums over the same issue as a result of minor shifts in the public mood.
19 Report of the Venice Commission No. 28. .
not refer in particular to such constitutional referendums. Thus,
as such a referendum is of utmost importance, the reference in
the constitution to citizens has to be interpreted as requiring
that a least 50% of the total electorate must vote in favour for the
referendum in order to initiate a change. With regard to the
draft referendum law of October 5 for a referendum on seces-
sion, we consider, that this draft fails to respect the wording of
Article 2 of the constitution, which refers to the citizens, and
in particular to the international legal requirements developed
in the Supreme Court of Canada Case relating to QuØbec.20
A clear majority for secession is also required by the decision
of the Supreme Court of Canada in a referendum on secession.21
In the subsequent Clarity Act passed by the Canadian Parliament
as a result of the Supreme Court judgment, in any referendum on
secession, the House of Commons must take into account the size
of the valid votes, the percentage of eligible voters and any other
question: In considering whether there has been a clear expres-
sion of a will by a clear majority of the population of a province
that the province cease to be part of Canada, the House of Com-
mons shall take into account the views of all political parties repre-
sented in the legislative assembly of the province whose govern-
ment proposed the referendum on secession, any formal state-
ments or resolutions by the government or legislative assembly of
any province or territory of Canada, any formal statements or res-
olutions by the Senate, any formal statements or resolutions by the
representatives of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, especially
those in the province whose government proposed the referendum
on secession, and any other views it considers to be relevant. 22
Taking these considerations and the conclusions of the Venice
Commission into account, we are of the opinion that the Federa-
tion can take a referendum as an initiative to open negotiations
for a secession into account only if at least an absolute majority
of the eligible voters voted in favour of secession. 
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20 A clear majority vote in Quebec on a clear question in favour of secession would
confer democratic legitimacy on the secession initiative which all of the other par-
ticipants in Confederation would have to recognize. (Supreme Court of Canada,
Reference re Secession of Quebec [1988] 2 S.C.R. 217).
21 Those principles must inform our overall appreciation of the constitutional
rights and obligations that would come into play in the event that a clear majority
of Quebecois votes on a clear question in favour of secession. (Op. cit.).
22 (a) the size of the majority of valid votes cast in favour of the secessionist option;
(b) the percentage of eligible voters voting in the referendum; and (c) any other
matters or circumstances it considers to be relevant. (Canada, Clarity Act 2000,
C. 26).
5.3.1.2.  Impact of the Referendum
On Montenegro:
It is obvious, that a referendum as such has no constitution-mak-
ing power by itself and this applies even in Montenegro. The refer-
endum may be the first step to possible constitutional amend-
ments. The argument that the will of the people is more impor-
tant than the will of the parliament overlooks the requirement
under constitutional law that the parliament must in the end
make the final decision when all consequences with regard to the
secession are known. Looking into the experience of several
secessionist referendums in Switzerland, where the people first
had to vote in order to initiate the procedure and then finally to
ratify the secessionist legal solution, the two decisions had a dif-
ferent impact on the people and hence different consequences.
Thus voters voted differently in the second referendum because
the consequences and the price to be paid were known fully only
in the final decision on secession. The Montenegrin Constitution
does not provide a second referendum, but instead a parliamen-
tary procedure for completing constitutional amendments. It is
only at this final stage that all the important and relevant infor-
mation will be known to the parliament. Accordingly the refer-
endum by itself does not invalidate or make unnecessary the par-
liamentary amendment procedure for the constitution. Conse-
quently the full procedures for amendment have to be followed
according to the constitution of Montenegro.
On Yugoslavia:
According to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
there is no internationally recognised right for unilateral seces-
sion based solely on a referendum within a federal unit founded
on the principle of self-determination. Thus, if a referendum
does take place in a constituent unit and if a majority of the citi-
zens vote for secession, the impact of the referendum would then
be only to initiate negotiations for a possible peaceful secession
on the federal level. These negotiations must take into account
the interests of the remaining republic, of minorities within
Montenegro, the legal consequences for citizens in Montenegro
and for citizens elsewhere in Yugoslavia, and of course the finan-
cial and property implications. 
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5.3.1.3.  Montenegrins Resident Outside Montenegro
The constitutional referendum should follow the general prin-
ciples applied in Montenegro for elections and referendums.
Thus, only citizens with residence in Montenegro would have the
right to vote. A change in this principle would require a specific
constitutional mandate prior to the referendum adopted accord-
ing to article 2 of the constitution.
5.3.1.4. Clear Questions
The Supreme Court of Canada, in its ruling on the issue of a
right to unilateral secession for QuØbec pointed out that the
question the citizens have to decide upon must be clear.23 This
decision of the Canadian Court also has some validity for the case
of Montenegro, as its decision on the right of unilateral secession
was based not only on Canadian domestic law but also on inter-
national law. 
In addition we would observe that any country, which has had
experience in direct democracy, has required clear questions to
be asked in any referendum. The aim of the referendum must be
to determine a clear will of the expression of the people. A ques-
tion is not clear, if it contains only an open mandate for negoti-
ations or if it obscures the debate.24 The question is not clear,
according to the Swiss tradition, if it contains two different
issues with different possible opinions of the voters, which have
to be answered by one vote. Finally, it is necessary that the ques-
tions contain only issues which can be decided by the Republic
and the Federation through negotiations. For instance the citi-
zens cannot decide on whether the independent Republic will be
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23 Those principles must inform our overall appreciation of the constitutional
rights and obligations that would come into play in the event that a clear majority
of Quebecers votes on a clear question in favour of secession. (Supreme Court of
Canada, op.cit.).
24 (4) For the purpose of subsection (3), a clear expression of the will of the popula-
tion of a province that the province cease to be part of Canada could not result
from 
(a) a referendum question that merely focuses on a mandate to negotiate with-
out soliciting a direct expression of the will of the population of that province on
whether the province should cease to be part of Canada; or 
(b) a referendum question that envisages other possibilities in addition to the
secession of the province from Canada, such as economic or political arrange-
ments with Canada, that obscure a direct expression of the will of the population
of that province on whether the province should cease to be part of Canada.
(Canada,Clarity Act 2000, c.26).
internationally recognized. Only the international community
can decide whether it will be internationally recognized. Citizens
cannot be asked, therefore, whether they want to decide in
favour of an independent and internationally recognised
Republic, as proposed in the new amendment of the law on Ref-
erendum of 5 October 2001. This amendment, however, has not
been adopted by the Montenegro Parliament.
5.3.2. Some General Principles to be Applied:
5.3.2.1. Citizens Concerned and Affected25
The decision of the citizens of Montenegro to secede con-
cerns first the citizens of Montenegro. Thus, the citizens have
to decide in a referendum, whether they will initiate negotia-
tions for dissolving the federation with the federation and the
Republic of Serbia. Democratically the citizens of Montenegro
cannot, however, unilaterally make a final and legally valid
decision on their own. They are part of the common Federa-
tion to which they owe loyalty. They have suffered in common
with all citizens of Yugoslavia through all the years since 1992.
A federation is also a solidarity pact and the principles of
democracy require that all parts of the federation be involved
in such crucial decisions which determine the future of the sta-
tus of the federation. 
5.3.2.2. Procedure to Establish a Clear Will of Citizens
The decisions of citizens have to express a clear will of the sov-
ereign. In order to achieve such a clear will, the procedure for a
democratic referendum has to follow some basic democratic
rules usually found for referendums in democracies:
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25 Democracy, however, means more than simple majority rule. Constitutional
jurisprudence shows that democracy exists in the larger context of other constitu-
tional values. Since Confederation, the people of the provinces and territories
have created close ties of interdependence (economic, social, political and cultur-
al) based on shared values that include federalism, democracy, constitutionalism
and the rule of law, and respect for minorities. A democratic decision of Quebe-
cers in favour of secession would put those relationships at risk. The Constitution
vouchsafes order and stability, and accordingly secession of a province under the
Constitution could not be achieved unilaterally, that is, without principled nego-
tiation with other participants in Confederation within the existing constitutional
framework. (Supreme Court of Canada, op.cit.).
The state organising the referendum has to give either official
bipartisan information or it has to invite both parties to inform
the voters on behalf of the state on the consequences of a positive
or negative result of the referendum. 
The state has to refrain from partisan intervention in the
debate. It should not finance the referendum campaign on behalf
of one party. In Switzerland the federal supreme court annulled
the Referendum of the Laufental because the Canton of Bern
intervened with an unreasonable hidden financial support
against secession.26
This obligation to neutrality limits not only the federal govern-
ment but also the republic government. The republic govern-
ment has to observe a double loyalty. It must, according to the
principle of federal loyalty, be loyal to the federation (the Ger-
man principle of Bundestreue), and it must be loyal to the citi-
zens. As long as the will of the citizens is not clear, it must inform
citizens objectively in a bipartisan way. It cannot favour a cam-
paign for or against one side in the referendum. The loyalty
towards the citizens means that the constitutional branches of
government as such should not influence the will of the citizens
by a specific partisan campaign. This does not exclude political
parties as such and representatives of parties from participating
in the campaign.
5.4.  DIVERSITY AND LEGITIMACY
5.4.1. Minorities27
Minority protection is frequently argued as an issue which
only has to be considered from the point of view of individual
human rights. When countries are confronted with foreign
immigrants, they may reduce the issue of their rights to individ-
ual human rights. But when countries like the FRY are confront-
ed with communities rooted by tradition, history and common
culture in the area and in the territory they are living in, minori-
ty rights have to be taken seriously and much more fundamental-
ly. Important minorities require that their identity be respected
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26 The decision of the Tribunal FØdØral of Switzerland 20th December 1988 BGE 114
Ia 427. 
27 See also 3.3. Constitutional Legitimacy.
as communities and that they are able to protect and enhance
their culture for future generations. On the constitutional level,
they need to be given the status of participants in state-making
and constitution-making in order to give the political authority
of the state legitimacy also in the eyes of the respective minori-
ties. To be respected as a community they need further to enjoy
autonomy and shared powers in government and collective
rights for language, religion, education and culture. 
We draw attention as a good model to the already mentioned
proposal for a new constitution for Serbia of the Human Rights
Centre of Belgrade which contains several provisions to guaran-
tee such general collective and individual rights for minorities:
Preamble:
Conscious of the state tradition of the Serbian people and
determined to establish the equality of all the peoples living in
Serbia
Part I: 
The Republic of Serbia shall be a multicultural democratic
state of all the citizens and peoples living in it
Chapter III  Special Rights of Persons belonging to National
Minorities and Respective Obligations of the Republic of Serbia:
Persons belonging to a national minority shall have special
rights, which they exercise individually or in community with
others.
The Republic of Serbia shall have the duty, wherever neces-
sary, to adopt adequate measures to promote the full and effec-
tive equality of persons belonging to a national minority and
those belonging to the majority in all spheres of economic, social,
political and cultural life.
5.4.2. State  Nation
Serbia and Montenegro are republics with several different
cultural communities. Thus, the issue of minorities has not only
to be addressed on the level of the Republics but also on the level
of the common state. With regard to the common state we are
even confronted with an additional problem, which is a heritage
of the old Yugoslavia. The reason, for the construction of a state
including all the Slavic nations in the south of the Balkans was
the fact, that there was no territory which was clear enough to be
given to one nation as a sovereign state. Thus, the international
community was in favour of a common state of all southern
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Slavic nations living within this territory in order to avoid vio-
lent state  making by the nations exercising ethnic cleansing
within their majority territory. 
Today the FRY is the remaining federation combining the two
nations: Serbs and Montenegrins. If the federal state remains,
both nations will have their own Republic. However, if the two
states are separated, each remaining Republic will have to accom-
modate some members of the former state-making nation as a
new minority nation not excluded from citizenship. If Serbs in
Montenegro and Montenegrins in Serbia were to wake up in a
new state as foreigners, conflict seems to be inevitable. And histo-
ry has shown that such a solution is almost impossible to achieve
without paying a terrible price.
In its decision on secession the Supreme Court of Canada did
hold that following a referendum on secession, the negotiations
which lead to a final secession would have to take into particular
account the rights of the different minorities.28 Thus, negotia-
tions on dissolution must focus upon the minorities living in
both Republics, and of course the minorities created by the new
states would be the Serbs in Montenegro and the Montenegrins
in Serbia. 
5.4.3. Sanjak29
Special consideration has to be taken of the so called district of
Sanjak. Today Sanjak is a region with a territory overlapping the
borderlines of Serbia and Montenegro. According to the last cen-
sus the district had a majority of Muslims. In the wars leading to
the break up of the former Yugoslavia it was indirectly but
strongly involved because of its geographical position close to
Bosnia-Herzegovina and to Kosovo. 
Sanjak is the Turkish word for district. The region called
Sanjak overlaps the borderlines of Serbia and Montenegro and
is today geographically the very link creating a direct neighbour-
hood of the two Republics. It has historically been called the
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28 Negotiations would need to address the interests of the other provinces, the feder-
al government and Quebec and indeed the rights of all Canadians both within and
outside Quebec, and specifically the rights of minorities.
29 We do not refer to regions with a specific history in Serbia such as Vojvodina
and Kosovo. We mention only the specific case of the district of Novi Pazar
named Sanjak as this historical territory overlaps the borderlines of Serbia and
Montenegro.
Sanjak of Novi Pazar (Bazar). In the treaty of Berlin30 recogniz-
ing Serbia and Montenegro as States in the European communi-
ty with restricted Autonomy, the district of Novi Pazar separat-
ing Montenegro and Serbia remained under the Turkish admin-
istration. In the first Balkan war it was conquered partly by Serbs
and partly by Montenegrins. Thus, neither the historically long-
lasting sovereignty of the Montenegrin Monarchy nor the Serbs
ever had sovereignty over the whole territory of the combined
present Montenegrin and Serbian parts of the Sanjak. It was
these municipalities in the Balkans which remained for the
longest time under the Turkish administration, that is until
1912. Thus, we are confronted with regard to this district with a
certain historical identity, which would overlap Montenegro
and Serbia. This particular human situation has to be taken into
account in any negotiation for the remaking of a Yugoslav Fed-
eration or its dissolution. 
5.4.4. Majorities
If a multicultural state has to guarantee peace among its differ-
ent communities, it has also to take into account the interests of
the majorities. Minorities cannot overstress their position and
prohibit the pursuance of the substantial interests of the majority.
In making constitutional arrangements these substantial interests
of majorities in the federation and in the two Republics have to be
addressed. Either the common state with the two Republics or the
two Republics must gain legitimacy with regard to the great bulk
of the society, that is both the majority and the minorities.
5.4.5. Tools and Instruments to be Considered:
Multiculturality is a constitutional challenge, which requires
different tools and instruments in order to create legitimacy and
loyalty, to manage conflicts between different communities, to
enhance identity and equality and to foster the existing diversity.
Those tools need to address institutions and decision-making
processes (shared power) in relation to constitution-making, leg-
islation, administration and the judiciary. Concepts for autonomy
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30 Art. XXV of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, which excluded the district of Novi Pazar
from the territory of Bosnia Herzegovina ruled by the Austrian-Hungarian
empire.
and decentralisation must be applied. And finally procedures for
conflict management have to be provided that have credibility for
fairness. These can enhance a political environment enabling rea-
sonable compromises. We will address only a few examples which
might give some indication of what might be considered for the
future federation. 
5.4.5.1. Decision Making
With regard to decision-making processes we focus on the
constitutional level, being aware that some of these tools might
also be considered appropriate for the ordinary legislative
processes:
On the constitution-making level we have to distinguish between
tools and instruments to be considered in the constitution-making
(pouvoir constitutant) and in the new constitutional institutions
(Legislature, Executive, Head of State, i.e. pouvoir constituØ). Fur-
ther one has to consider that tools are needed to protect minorities,
to enhance their development, to foster their integration, and also
to manage conflicts between the communities. 
The actual constitution-making process has to observe the
legal rules provided for making a new constitution according to
the existing constitution of the FRY. By observing legality one
also gains legitimacy. Thus, the different parties will have to seek
the informal approval (power-sharing) of the different minori-
ties in order to gain the necessary legitimacy. Important minori-
ties must be taken seriously at the state-making level. They must
be given the possibility to identify with the new constitution as
their proper state and constitution, a conviction shared with
other communities. It is obvious, that such a constitution-mak-
ing procedure will require compromises at all levels of the con-
cerned communities. 
The new constitution will have to provide amendment proce-
dures which exclude the possibility of majorities violating the
substantial interests of minorities. It may provide alarm bell pro-
cedures such as those employed in the Belgium federation31 or
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31 Belgium Constitution, Article 54 [Group Veto, Alarm-Bell Procedure]:
(1) With the exception of budgets and laws requiring a special majority, a jus-
tified motion, signed by at least three-quarters of the members of one of the lin-
guistic groups and introduced following the introduction of the report and prior
to the final vote in a public session, can declare that the provisions of a draft bill or
of a motion are of a nature to gravely damage relations between the Communities.
along the lines of the proposals of the Rambouillet-Accord pro-
tecting vital interests of minorities.32 Important for reconciling
the majority and minority concerns are also optingout provi-
sions such as those employed in Canada.33 Finally one might also
consider such tools of direct democracy as referendums and ini-
tiatives. Although direct democracy is majority oriented, it also
has an important disincentive effect, as it encourages the political
elite to seek consensus. In the Swiss experience, if the political
elite does not find a consensus, the people have usually rejected
the proposals in the subsequent referendum. Thus, the disin-
centive of direct democracy may very well enhance the develop-
ment of a consensus-driven democracy, and this has proven to be
an excellent tool for conflict management. 
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(2) In this case, the parliamentary procedure is suspended and the motion
referred to the Council of Ministers which, within thirty days, gives its justified
recommendations on the motion and invites the implicated House to express its
opinion on these recommendations or on the draft bill or motion that has been
revised if need be.
Article 99 [Composition of Government]:
(1) The Council of Ministers includes fifteen members at most.
(2) With the possible exception of the Prime Minister, the Council of Ministers
includes as many French-speaking members as Dutch-speaking members.
32 Rambouillet Agreement 1 Constitution: Article II: The Assembly General .The fol-
lowing procedure shall be used in the event of a motion under paragraph 7: The
Members making the vital interest motion shall give reasons for their motion. The
proposers of the legislation shall be given an opportunity to respond. The Mem-
bers making the motion shall appoint within one day a mediator of their choice to
assist in reaching an agreement with those proposing the legislation. If mediation
does not produce an agreement within seven days, the matter may be submitted
for a binding ruling. The decision shall be rendered by a panel comprising three
Members of the Assembly: one Albanian and one Serb, each appointed by his or
her national community delegation; and a third Member, who will be of a third
nationality and will be selected within two days by consensus of the Presidency of
the Assembly. A vital interest motion shall be upheld if the legislation challenged
adversely affects the communitys fundamental constitutional rights, additional
rights as set forth in Article VII, or the principle of fair treatment. If the motion is
not upheld, the challenged legislation shall enter into force for that community. 
33 Examples of opting out provisions in the Canadian Constitution Act 1982, are
sections 38(3) and 40 allowing provinces to opt-out of constitutional amend-
ments. In addition under ordinary legislation in Canada there are a variety of fed-
eral tax abatement arrangements for provinces opting out of federal programs for
social welfare, youth allowances, etc., and also provisions relating to program
delivery by provinces (e.g. student loans) where there have been opt-out arrange-
ments for provinces.
Another interesting Canadian proposal, although in the end not ratified was
the Meech Lake Accord, 1987, section 7 of which stated: The Government of
Canada shall provide reasonable compensation to the government of a province
that chooses not to participate in a national shared-cost program that is estab-
lished by the Government of Canada 
5.4.5.2. Institutions
Apart from the construction of a two-chamber parliament, the
most challenging institutions to be established are the head of
state and the executive. The executive has to be an efficient insti-
tution to promote economic and political development, and at
the same time it has to integrate the different communities. The
Swiss experience with a fixed-term collegial executive and head
of state of seven council members all elected individually by the
united two chambers and a rotating head of state has superbly
combined efficiency with consensus driven policies. This system,
however, has to include within it the checks and balances of the
three governmental branches and the expression of the will of the
citizens through regular referendums and initiatives.
Important consideration has also to be given to the electoral
system. The electoral system must produce an efficient parlia-
ment representing the different social tendencies of the multicul-
tural society. To achieve such an aim, one has to find the delicate
balance between a proportional electoral system and constituen-
cies small enough to guarantee legitimate representation but
large enough to give different communities a chance to be best
represented in parliament.
5.4.5.3. Autonomy
Autonomy is a major tool to enhance the identity and the
expectation of a prosperous cultural and economic development
of a community as part of the multicultural common state. Fed-
erations enable extensive territorial and personal autonomy
combined with power-sharing of the different political entities.
Asymmetric multicultural societies dispersed throughout the ter-
ritory require additional autonomy on the municipal level and
also autonomy based on collective rights such as those recom-
mended in the proposal for a new constitution for Serbia by the
Human Rights Centre of Belgrade. 
5.5.  FACILITATING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
It is a widely recognized experience elsewhere in the world that
constitutional and political stability and the rule of law are
important preconditions for domestic economic development
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and for encouraging foreign trade and investment. It is not sur-
prising therefore that constitutional uncertainty and lack of
progress in resolving the relationship of Montenegro to the FRY
have contributed to slow economic and industrial development,
a lower standard of living and high unemployment, substantial
imbalances between exports and imports, and weak foreign
investment in both Serbia and Montenegro.
In such a situation the burden on Montenegro has been fur-
ther increased by the effort to maintain a quasi-independent gov-
ernment and administrative machinery corresponding to that
required in a much larger country the size of Austria but with less
than 700,000 inhabitants and a GDP of around US$1,100 per
capita. The result has been a serious budget deficit, which has
been covered by the international community, primarily the
United States of America. Since the self-financing of Montenegro
in the long-term is appearing to be untenable, Montenegros sur-
vival in a financial sense requires extensive reform, either in the
direction of such microstates as Liechtenstein, San Marino or
Malta, or as a more integrated part of a reformed federation.
Both the Montenegro Government Union proposal and the
DOS-FRY Coalition restructured federation proposal identify
the need for a common market and currency, but the proposals
differ in the way in which these would be coordinated or inte-
grated. In this respect it is worth noting that experience else-
where indicates that federations or quasi-federal hybrids (of
which the EU is an example) have been more effective in manag-
ing economic development than have loose confederal unions,
such as that proposed in the Montenegro Government Union
proposal. Indeed, the relative economic effectiveness of federa-
tions over other forms of government has received some at-
tention from scholars.34
The importance of this criterion i.e., facilitating economic
development, in assessing alternative proposals for reconstruct-
ing the federation, is emphasized by recent public opinion sur-
veys in Yugoslavia such as that carried out by the G17 Institute in
September 2001. It appears that two-thirds of the respondents
are now dissatisfied with their way of living. Recent surveys have
also indicated that eradicating poverty and achieving higher
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34 See, for instance U. Wachendorfer-Schmidt, ed., Federalism and Political Perfor-
mance, 2000.
salaries, which had been low on the list of issues of interest to the
public in 1990, are now at the top of the list.35
5.6.  CONDITIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE EU AND
COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
5.6.1. Statements from the EU
As far as the political and constitutional requirements for a
future admission of the FRY to the EU are concerned there are
very clear and precise official statements made recently by some
leading EU bodies. 
5.6.1.1. The General Affairs Council
The most important decision in this matter was made on 22
January 2001 by the General Affairs Council of the EU with its
Conclusions on FRY/Serbia in the following wording:
Policies of democratic and economic reform, reconciliation
and regional cooperation, will bring the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia closer to the European Union, through the Stabilisa-
tion and Association Process, in line with Councils conclusions
of May 1999. 
To this end the Council underlines the need for the FRY, like the
other countries in the region, to meet the criteria of the European
Unions regional approach agreed by the Council in 1997, build-
ing on commitments made by all participants at the Zagreb Sum-
mit as regards the respect for democratic principles, human rights
and the rule of law, full cooperation with ICTY, respect for and
protection of minorities, market economy reforms, regional coop-
eration, and compliance with obligations under Dayton/Paris and
UNSCR 1244.
The Council recalls the important political and financial
efforts already made by the European Union to encourage the
consolidation of democracy and reforms in the FRY. As further
sign of its support, it decided to send an EU ministerial troika to
Belgrade in early February.
The Council urges the authorities in Belgrade as well as in Pod-
gorica to agree on an open and democratic process, within an
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overall Federal framework, to decide on a new constitutional
arrangement for the relations between the components of the
Federation acceptable to all parties. The Council welcomes the
readiness shown by President Kostunica to play a constructive
role to that end. It underlines the importance of avoiding any
unilateral action which could jeopardise this negotiating process
and to ensure the democratic legitimacy of its outcome. It reaf-
firms its conviction that any renegotiation of the Federal rela-
tionship must be consistent with the internal stability of the FRY
and the regional stability of South Eastern Europe.
5.6.1.2.  Sven-Olof Petersson, Head of the Political Troika
After the talks of the mentioned EU Political Troika (consist-
ing of Minister for Foreign Affairs Anna Lindh, Secretary Gener-
al of the European Council secretariat and High Representative
of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana,
and EU Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten) in
Belgrade and Podgorica Mr. Sven-Olof Petersson, senior official
in the Swedish Foreign Ministry and head of the troika, made the
following statement on 9 February 2001:
We want to see an open and democratic process leading to a
new constitutional arrangement acceptable to all parties. We
expect Belgrade and Podgorica to negotiate in good faith and
trust that the parties will ensure democratic legitimacy of the
outcome. No unilateral action should be taken which could jeop-
ardise this process.
Any renegotiation of the Federal relationship must take into
account the internal stability of the FRY and the regional stabili-
ty of South Eastern Europe.
We further expect the media in Montenegro and in Serbia to
cover the issue fully and fairly, and to ensure that the full range of
views in this important debate is heard by the citizens of Mon-
tenegro and Serbia. It is their future that is at stake, and they are
entitled to be fully informed of the implications of any particular
course of action. 
5.6.1.3. Anna Lindh, Foreign Minister of Sweden
This press release was preceded and enlarged by another state-
ment of Foreign Minister Anna Lindh on 8 February 2001,
explaining the expectations of the EU in a more detailed manner:
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The EU has clearly expressed its expectations on the new
leadership in Belgrade. There is a need for a comprehensive
reform programme to bring Yugoslavia fully back into Europe;
to get the economy in shape, to repeal the restrictive legislation
of the Milosevic years of mismanagement and to release Koso-
var Albanian and other political prisoners. Within this context
we have expressed our expectation of full cooperation with the
international war crimes tribunal. A process has started. We
would now like to see quick concrete results of this coopera-
tion.
5.6.1.4. The Permanent Council
These positions have been reaffirmed by two further state-
ments of the Permanent Council of the EU, the first on 19 July
2001:
Following the formation of the new government in Montene-
gro, the EU stresses the importance of rapidly establishing a dia-
logue between Podgorica and Belgrade on a future constitutional
arrangement acceptable to all and consistent with regional and
internal stability.   
The second on 13 September 2001:
We also encourage a creative discussion between the authori-
ties in FRY, Serbia and Montenegro on their future relationship.
We welcome the recent proposal from the DOS coalition for a
revised relationship and we encourage the authorities in Podgor-
ica to negotiate in a constructive way. We would expect any solu-
tion to be agreed between Belgrade and Podgorica and to have
complete democratic legitimacy. We believe that a revised rela-
tionship between the two Republics within a single Federal State
is the best way to preserve regional stability.
The EU insists so decisively and strongly in a federal solution
or roof over Montenegro and Serbia that this point was includ-
ed even in the list of European Union Priorities submitted to
the 56th plenary session of the United Nations General Assem-
bly: The EU supports a democratic Montenegro in a democratic
Yugoslavia; it encourages an early resumption of the dialogue
between the new Government in Podgorica and Belgrade with a
view to redefining their relations in an agreement acceptable to
all parties.
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5.6.2.  Statements from the Council of Europe
In a similar way the Council of Europe and its officials try to
assess and to examine the legal and constitutional situation in the
FRY with regard to a future membership of the federation.
5.6.2.1 The Committee of Ministers
After the 109th session of the Committee of Ministers in Stras-
bourg, 7-8 November 2001, the chair Ernst Walch, Minister of For-
eign Affairs of Liechtenstein, stated in his Conclusion inter alia:
Lastly, the 109th Session provided an opportunity for the
ministers to take stock of the most important developments at
the Council of Europe in recent month. In particular, the Minis-
ters welcomed the progress made by Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia down the road to acces-
sion to the Council of Europe, and hoped that the conditions
that had to be met to allow these two countries to join  each
on its own merits and in accordance with established procedures
and the criteria applicable to all.
5.6.2.2 Report on the Conformity of Legal Standards
Nevertheless, the recent report on the conformity of the legal
order in the FRY with Council of Europe standards, presented on
7 November 2001 by the former President of the European Court
of Human Rights Rudolph Bernhardt (Germany), and a former
judge of the court Raimo Pekkanen (Finland) concludes, that
the legal order of Yugoslavia is not, at this stage, in conformi-
ty with the Council of Europe standards.
But the authors believe, with regard to the application for
membership of the FRY dated from 9 November 2000, that
the basis and the potential for meeting the requirements in
respect of democracy, the rule of law and human rights are pres-
ent. Giving the existing willingness and capacity to carry out pro-
grammes involving new legislation, institutional changes and
other reforms, it may be expected that the FRY will comply in the
foreseeable future with Council of Europe standards.
The report emphasises that a vast reform programme has been
implemented, although the pace of the reforms is too slow,
which the authors attribute mainly to internal political problems.
Concerning democracy, the report notes that 
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the institutions of the legislature and the executive are formed
by means of democratic elections and there is a multi-party sys-
tem and a developed structure of ordinary courts. However, the
constitutional crisis and political problems in the relations
between Serbia and Montenegro are creating considerable diffi-
culties that will have to be resolved as soon as possible. Large
parts of the legal framework governing state institutions are out-
dated and certain areas, especially with regard to judicial inde-
pendence, require urgent and radical reform.
The rule of law is enshrined in the three constitutions of the
FRY as well as of Serbia and Montenegro, and the FRY has a
developed legal system. However, the authors report a high
degree of legal uncertainty, mostly due to lack of harmonisation
of laws. Problems they pinpoint include the enforcement of
judgements, the reform of the police and compliance with judi-
cial decisions by the state authorities. The constitutions guaran-
tee most of the fundamental rights protected by the European
Convention on Human Rights and its protocols, according to the
report. However, this protection is seen to be insufficient in cer-
tain areas, such as deprivation of liberty, civil and criminal pro-
cedure, minority rights, freedom of expression and the media
and freedom of association. Finally, complete abolition of capital
punishment and full cooperation with the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia are areas where urgent
action is needed, according to the rapporteurs.
5.6.2.3. Interim Report of the Venice Commission
In the meantime, an interim report on the constitutional situ-
ation of the FRY was adopted by the Venice Commission at its
48th Plenary Meeting in Venice, 19-20 October 2001, based on
comments by Gerard Batliner (Liechtenstein), Jeffrey Jowell
(United Kingdom), and Kaarlo Tuori (Finland). The conclusions
of the report underline the importance of the open constitution-
al questions:
The Commission is concerned at the lack of secure constitu-
tional foundations, which are impeding necessary democratic
reforms at all levels and causing an atmosphere of uncertainty. It
calls on the authorities to start official work on new constitutions
as soon as possible, taking full account of helpful existing drafts,
in particular that of the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights. As
regards the question of the future status of Montenegro, it notes
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that solving this issue by way of a referendum alone presents dif-
ficulties in terms both of the legality and the legitimacy of such a
solution. The Commission therefore urges the interested parties
to try to reach a common proposal through bona fide negotia-
tions, which could then be submitted to a popular referendum
and confirmed by the relevant decisions.      
This statement made it quite clear, that one of the main pre-
conditions for the admission of the FRY as a member of the
European Council is the solution of its internal constitutional
problems. 
5.6.3. Political Expectations 
Summarising the content of the quoted statements and docu-
ments the following conditions will be fundamental in view of a
possible accession or admission of the FRY and its regions to the
EU as well as to the Council of Europe. 
5.6.3.1. Structural Conditions
All mentioned statements emphasise the need for a new
constitutional arrangement of the relations between the FRG and
their two components: the Republics of Montenegro and Serbia
(including the autonomous province of Kosovo). This arrange-
ment should lead to new or revised constitutions on the federal
as well as on the member state level. 
The future relations between the Republics of Montenegro and
Serbia should be based on a federal framework. The EU and the
Council of Europe have rejected all proposals for any kind of a
con-federal structure. The demand for a so called federal roof is
indispensable and indisputable. That means also the preservation
or restoration of a renewed and reformed FRY as a sovereign state.
The new constitutional arrangements concerning a re-estab-
lished federation have to be acceptable to all involved parties and
political movements. Therefore, compromises are needed and
the spirit or willingness of living together in a multi-ethnic socie-
ty instead of a split into hostile minorities with an uncertain
future.
The results of the negotiations on the federal relations of the
components to each other and to the FRY must be consistent
with the internal stability of the FRY and the regional stability of
South Eastern Europe. 
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A revised relationship between Montenegro and Serbia within
a single Federal State is seen as the best way to preserve and
strengthen regional stability. Therefore, the EU and the Council
of Europe support a democratic Montenegro and a democratic
Serbia as two parts with equal rights in a democratic federal
Yugoslavia.
5.6.3.2. Institutional Conditions
The institutions of the legislature and the executive, although
formed by democratic elections, suffer in large parts from an
outdated legal framework governing these institutions. Especial-
ly the independence of the judiciary needs urgent reforms and
changes of the respective statutes.
The EU and the Council of Europe expect in the foreseeable
future efficient steps and actions to reduce the high degree of
legal uncertainty mainly caused by a lack of harmonisation of
laws and by deficits of their execution.  
Other constitutional and administrative problems which have
to be solved include the enforcement of judgements, the reform
of the police and the acceptance of judicial decisions by the state
authorities.
The guarantees of human and civil rights in the constitutions
have to be fully implemented also in crucial areas such as the
freedom of mass media and the freedom of association. The pro-
tection of these rights is considered as insufficient with regard to
the deprivation of liberty, civil and criminal procedure, minority
rights, the abolition of capital punishment, and last but not least
the cooperation with the ICTY.
5.6.3.3. Procedural Conditions
The EU and the Council of Europe ask for a negotiating
process in good faith and trust or bona fide negotiations in the
next future. The insist in results acceptable for all parties and
reject any unilateral action which may jeopardise the whole
negotiating process. 
The work on new constitutions should start as soon as possi-
ble. The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe men-
tioned expressively the Platform of DOS, welcomed also by the
EU, and the proposals of the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights
as adequate and useful drafts for the future constitutions.  
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At the end of the process a common proposal of the new
constitutional order in the FRY reached by bona fide negotia-
tions could be submitted to a popular referendum and con-
firmed by decisions of the three parliaments.  
5.6.3.4. Open and Democratic process
The main precondition of the European organisations 
important not only with regard to a future membership of the
FRY, but also as far as the economic cooperation and the finan-
cial support are concerned  is the strong demand for an open
and democratic political process.
That includes the respect for democratic principles, human
rights, the rule of law, protection of minorities, reconciliation,
economic reforms, and regional cooperation. A comprehensive
reform programme for all parts of the FRY based on these demo-
cratic values should bring the whole federation closer to the
European communities.
All statements highlighted the essential purpose and aim of this
process. i.e. to ensure the constitutional legality and the demo-
cratic legitimacy and of its outcome. The solutions agreed by the
involved parties must be not only legally in accordance with the
existing constitutions, but also based on decisions of the peoples
and/or parliaments with a sufficient majority justifying the funda-
mental changes in the new constitutional order of the FRY. 
From this point of view the plan of the present government of
Montenegro to organise a referendum on its independence (and
consequently on the dissolution of the FRY) contradicts the con-
ditions of the EU and the Council of Europe from three aspects:
firstly, it is a denied unilateral step; secondly, it strikes at the
principle of legality, because Art. 2 Sect. 4 of the Constitution of
Montenegro provides only for a previous referendum opening
the procedure for amending the constitution in terms of Art. 118
and 119 with regard to the status with a two thirds majority in the
parliament; thirdly, it does not produce sufficient legitimacy in
limiting the success to an approval of a simple majority with
binding effects for later decisions of the parliament. Therefore,
the European bodies will never accept this destabilising policy.   
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6.  Recommendations 
Our recommendations focus upon four possible alternative
solutions: (1) dissolution of the federation to create two inde-
pendent states of Serbia and Montenegro subject to international
law, (2) the proposal for a confederal Union of Montenegro and
Serbia as set out in the Government of Montenegro Platform,
December 2000, and possible variants of this approach, (3) the
proposal for constitutional restructuring of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia as set out by the Joint Platform of the Coalition of
the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) and the Together
for Yugoslavia Coalition (TFY) September 2001, and possible
variants of this approach, and (4) the constitutional status quo.
Our recommendations are grouped under four headings: (1)
General Procedural Recommendations applying to all four
alternatives, (2) Specific Procedural Recommendations applying
to each of the four alternatives, (3) Substantive Recommenda-
tions concerning the structures, institutions, processes and
desirability of the four alternatives, and (4) a final concluding
recommendation.
6.1.  GENERAL PROCEDURAL RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Criteria for evaluating alternative solutions
We recommend that in evaluating alternative solutions, the
criteria set out in section 5 of our report be applied. These are
facilitating good governance in terms of effectiveness, accounta-
bility and responsiveness, restoring the rule of law and legal legit-
imacy, facilitating open and democratic processes, providing for
diversity and the legitimacy of the distinctive interests of Mon-
tenegro and Serbia and of minority interests within these states,
facilitating economic development throughout Montenegro and
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Serbia, and particularly important, developing the conditions for
accession to membership in the European Union and the Coun-
cil of Europe.
2. The importance of consensus and democracy
We recommend that any resolution be based on a negotiated
consensus of the three governments and parliaments openly
and democratically arrived at rather than by unilateral action
of particular governments. This is essential both for the internal
legitimacy of any solution arrived at, and for international legiti-
macy.
3. Constitutional legality and rule of law
We recommend that the processes by which consensus solu-
tions are reached be in conformity with existing constitutions
and the rule of law. This legality is essential for the internal and
external legitimacy of any resolution arrived at. Otherwise, any
solution arrived at, even though based on consensus, will always
be open to subsequent challenge as not having been arrived at
legitimately.
4. The creation of incentives and disincentives
We recommend that in the consideration or design of any
structures and institutions, these be evaluated not simply in
terms of the structures and the elements composing them, but
in terms of the incentives or disincentives they create for subse-
quent political action and behaviour. Constitutions are not
ends in themselves. They are important because they induce and
channel the ways in which citizens and politicians act to establish
policies. The function of constitutions is not merely to assign sta-
tus to constituent elements, but to establish processes for effec-
tive policy-making. One example is the way in which in Switzer-
land the constitutional provision for legislative referendums has
induced efforts among the political parties to achieve consensus
within the Federal Assembly in order to minimize the risk of ref-
erendum challenges to their legislation. Another is the way in
which in Germany the existence of the Bundesrat (a second
chamber composed of representative of the Land government
executives) has encouraged the federal government to take
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account of the interests of the Länder, and of the Land govern-
ments to be supportive of the concerns of the federation as a
whole. 
5. Consideration of the particular circumstances of Serbia
and Montenegro
We recommend that in adopting an institutional solution,
the particular circumstances of Serbia and Montenegro be
taken into account. There is no single ideal form of state, union
or federation. These are pragmatic tools for achieving the welfare
of citizens. Constitutions and institutions therefore, must be
adapted to the particular circumstances of the country in ques-
tion. Examples of models elsewhere may be helpful, but modifi-
cations to such models and innovations to fit the particular situ-
ations of Yugoslavia, Montenegro and Serbia are essential. 
6.2. SPECIFIC PROCEDURAL RECOMMENDATIONS
6. Procedures in the case of the dissolution of the FRY
We recommend that if the FRY is to be dissolved the proce-
dures followed must be democratically and legally legitimate.
To be legally legitimate the procedure would need to take into
account the legal requirements outlined in Sections 3. and 5.2. of
our report. The appropriate procedure would be an initial con-
sultative referendum under Article 2, para. 4, of the existing
Montenegro Constitution or in the case of Serbia under Article 2,
para. 2, of the Serbian Constitution. The Montenegro Law on
Referendum came into force on 2.03.2001 refers in article 37 to
decisions by a majority of the votes of citizens voting provided a
majority of the total number of citizens having the right to vote
have voted.36 However, because Article 2 of the Montenegro
Constitution, which overrides this, requires that any change in
the status of the country shall be decided by the citizens, we
interpret the latter to mean that what is required is a majority of
the citizens, i.e. those eligible to vote and resident in Montene-
gro, not just a majority of those voting. We note that the
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36 The proposed amendment to this law in 2001 has not as yet been adopted by the
Parliament of Montenegro.
Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that under international law
a referendum on secession to be internationally recognized as
legitimate, requires a clear question and a clear majority.
Furthermore, that judgement noted that such a referendum by
itself is insufficient under international law for international
recognition of a unilateral secession. A referendum with a clear
majority in favour of secession in response to a clear question
would have to be followed by a negotiated agreement upon a
constitutional amendment of the federal constitution. Applying
this to Yugoslavia, if the FRY is to be dissolved, the referendum
result could be implemented only by subsequent action under
procedures set out in Articles 140-142 of the existing FRY consti-
tution. It would also require amendment of articles 1 and 2 of the
Montenegro Constitution under the procedure set out in Articles
118 and 119. It is quite clear that a referendum result, while a
necessary precondition, would by itself be insufficient for inter-
national recognition of unilateral secession. Furthermore to be
valid, the wording of any referendum question that implies that
international recognition would automatically follow would be
misleading to the voters. We would also note that the Badinter
judgment on the status of the Federation of the Republic of
Yugoslavia was made before the adoption of the current FRY
Constitution in 1992, and therefore cannot apply to its status. 
7. Procedures in the case of establishing a confederal union
We recommend that in the case of establishing a Union of
Montenegro and Serbia as proposed by the Government of
Montenegro, December 2000, the procedure required would be
either: 
 dissolution of the current FRY employing fully in all re-
spects the procedure outlined in Recommendation 6
above, followed by negotiations between the Montenegro
and Serbia governments reaching agreement on the new
structure and ratifying it by the processes set out in arti-
cles 118 and 119 of the Montenegro Constitution and arti-
cles 132-4 of the Serbia Constitution, or 
 an alternative procedure which would be to amend the
structure of the FRY through procedures set out in Arti-
cles 140 to 142 of the Constitution of the FRY and to
amend articles 1 and 2 of the Montenegro Constitution
applying Article 119. 
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One of these two procedures would be required to give the
Union the legal legitimacy required for international recogni-
tion.
8. Procedure for restructuring the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia
We recommend that the procedure required for a constitu-
tional restructuring of the FRY as proposed by the DOS and the
TFY Coalition, would involve negotiations among the three
governments of Montenegro, Serbia and the FRY, followed by
implementation employing the constitutional amendment
procedures set out in articles 140 to 142 of the FRY Constitu-
tion 1992 and subsequent amendments. Consensual agreement
among the three governments would meet the requirement of
political legitimacy, and ratification employing the formal con-
stitutional amendment procedure would meet the requirement
for legitimacy in terms of legality.
9. Procedure in the case of maintaining the constitutional
status quo
To maintain the constitutional status quo would require no
legal change, but because of the current challenges to its politi-
cal legitimacy steps would need to be taken to restore its legiti-
macy through negotiations and agreements among the three
governmental bodies of the FRY, Serbia and Montenegro. In its
current form the lack of enforcement of the full provisions of the
FRY Constitution has created de facto a dysfunctional federation
and a crisis of political legitimacy. In the context of the contested
legitimacy of the current constitution of the FRY, effectiveness is
possible only if the three governmental bodies agree to work
together to achieve a cooperative democratically based consensus
supporting it. 
6.3.  SUBSTANTIVE RECOMMENDATIONS
10. Avoidance of dissolution of the common state
We recommend that dissolution of the common state in
order to create two independent states of Montenegro and Ser-
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bia subject to international law be avoided. We also so recom-
mend because the resulting advantages would on balance be
considerably outweighed by the shortcomings in terms of eco-
nomic development and meeting the conditions for accession
to the European Union. Two smaller independent states, pro-
vided that they are established under the procedures outlined in
Recommendation 6, would have some advantages. Smaller less
complex political states may facilitate democratic processes and
governmental responsiveness, avoid the difficulties of balancing
the interests of Serbia and Montenegro with a population ratio of
about 15:1, and avoid the problems of reconciling different tariff
rates, currencies and economic systems. On the other hand, on
three of the criteria outlined in Recommendation 1 there would
be serious problems. First, given the sharpness of divisions on the
issue within Montenegro, it will be difficult to establish the cohe-
siveness necessary for an effective independent government, and
there is a real prospect that it could contribute to serious internal
instability within Montenegro. Economic development is likely
to be hampered by discouraging investment and in an increas-
ingly globalized international economy it is virtually impossible
for very small states to respond effectively. Most important it
would reduce to virtually nothing the prospects for accession to
the EU by either of the two resulting states. The EU is becoming
increasingly reluctant to accept for additional membership small
states lacking wealth, and it has made it abundantly clear, as
noted in Section 5.6 of our report, that for purposes of accession
it would require a common state of Yugoslavia. The choice of
two independent states as a political solution would therefore
come at a heavy long-term economic price.
11. Problems of the Confederal Union Proposal
We recommend that the proposal for a Union of Montene-
gro and Serbia, as set out in the Government of Montenegro
Platform, December 2000, or any closely related variant of
this proposal be rejected. If a confederal solution is adopted,
to be effective it will require all the features of the unofficial
alternative proposal for a Union of Montenegro and Serbia
proposed by the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights (2001).
While the proposal of the Government of Montenegro pro-
vides the façade of cooperative action within which Montene-
gros currently de facto independent role could continue, the
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smallness of the benefits that would be obtained are far out-
weighed by the complexity of decision-making arrangements
that would govern the limited fields of joint jurisdiction. While
it is often inferred that the new Union would parallel the model
of the European Union, the Union, as outlined in the Montene-
grin government official proposal, would in fact be much weak-
er than the EU in which the competencies for economic harmo-
nization have in practice become quite extensive. The principle
of rotation of offices and responsibilities would be far more
extensive than in the EU, and would lack the counterbalancing
features of a permanent Commission which in the EU provides
an important policy-making and continuity function. It would
also lack the qualified voting patterns that exist in the Council to
recognize to some degree differences in the size of the con-
stituent states. Nor is there any provision comparable to the
European Court for enforcing decisions. Thus, the proposal
appears to create the equivalent of a complex automobile that
lacks an effective engine. This would appear to replicate the situ-
ation of the short-lived West Indies Federation 1958-62 in
which, although technically a federation, the joint powers were
so weak that the member states found that their frustrations far
outweighed any compensating benefits, and the larger member
states soon abandoned the enterprise. In the Montenegro Gov-
ernments official Union proposal little is gained but at the cost
of considerable complexity and restriction upon the exercise of
possible initiatives by the constituent units. It is difficult to see
any advantage for Serbia (and even for Montenegro) of such an
arrangement over full independence. Particularly crucial is the
insistence in this proposal upon participation of the member
states as separate entities in international bodies including the
EU, a requirement that would make accession to the EU much
more difficult to achieve.
In the contemporary world, confederal systems have had
increasing appeal because of the protection they potentially offer
for the sovereignty of the member states. In practice, however,
there have been extremely few stable confederal systems and
where they consist of only two units deadlocks have been virtual-
ly unavoidable. In federations, because their central institutions
are directly elected by the citizens, these have had greater demo-
cratic legitimacy enabling them to undertake more decisive
action. The only really successful confederal system in the con-
temporary world is the EU, but much of its success derives from
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the fact that it is actually a hybrid of confederal and federal insti-
tutions rather than a pure confederation.
Although there is no international evidence to suggest that two
member confederations are any more effective than two-member
federations, if it is decided that some form of confederal Union
proposal is to be proceeded with, then in our view it would need
to incorporate at an absolute minimum all the features of the
alternative proposal for a Union of Montenegro and Serbia (pub-
lished by the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, 2001). The key
features of that proposal (see s. 4.1.2.1.) were that the confederal
Union of Montenegro and Serbia would be considered a single
entity within the international community and for purposes of
accession to the EU, would have competency over four areas
(protection of human rights, defence, foreign policy and single
market), its competencies would include levying and collecting
the value added tax, there would be a unicameral Union As-
sembly of 81 members with seats distributed to take some
account of the difference in size of the member states but requir-
ing a five-eights majority to ensure that any majority vote would
include a majority from each member-state, implementation of
Union statutes would be vested with the Union Government, the
Union Government would take all decisions jointly and as a sin-
gle body, and there would be a High Court of Justice. This would
avoid some of the shortcomings of the Government of Montene-
gro proposal and would provide the minimum requirement for
an effective confederal Union.
12. A limited common state
We recommend that agreement upon some form of a limited
common state along the lines advanced in the proposal for con-
stitutional restructuring of the FRY set out in the joint plat-
form of the DOS and the TFY Coalition (September 2001), pos-
sibly with some negotiated agreement upon further modifica-
tions (see recommendation 13), be accepted as the preferred
objective. This would envisage a functional federation, more
decentralised than the present federal constitution, with the min-
imal set of functions necessary for the joint and effective resolu-
tion of issues of common interest, provide for co-operation
between federal and republic bodies in processes of decision-
making and performing joint functions, and leave to the
republics all other competencies. It would need to be based on
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the principles of equality of the federal units and the operability
of the federation as a whole. In relation to the criteria identified
in Recommendation 1, it is the alternative most likely to achieve
in a balanced way the fulfilment of the whole range of criteria,
and it is by far the likeliest to facilitate full and earlier member-
ship in the EU, a very important consideration. By comparison
with the federal status quo, it would recognize the need for a
more limited range of federal competencies. Experience in other
federations (and, it should be noted, equally in confederal
unions) does indicate that federations with only two member
states and those with radical variations in the size of constituent
units face particular difficulties. Consequently, special institu-
tions or procedures including some confederal elements to deal
with these problems will need to be developed. These and some
other suggested modifications to the DOSTFY proposals are
outlined in Recommendation 13 below. 
13. Possible modifications to the proposal for a limited
common state
We recommend that to ensure the effective operation of the
reorganized common state a number of modifications to the
constitutional restructuring proposed in the joint platform of
DOS and TFY Coalition (September 2001) be considered and
agreed upon.
Some of our recommendations are elaborations where the
official proposal does not go into sufficient detail, and some are
suggested modifications to enhance effectiveness. They take into
account various documents and proposals such as those of the
Belgrade Centre for Human Rights (2001), of President Kostu-
nica (January 2001), of the Center for Liberal-Democratic Stud-
ies (Belgrade, 2000), and some features in the Montenegro Gov-
ernment proposal for Union (December 2000), as well as our
own experience and knowledge of federal and confederal politi-
cal systems throughout the world. In any solution a balance will
need to be found between sufficient minority protection on the
one hand, and minimizing majority frustration on the other.
Given the imbalance in population, size, and economic capacity
between Serbia and Montenegro in a federation of only two
units special features will be necessary. The modifications we
propose for consideration relate to six broad areas outlined
below:
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(1) We suggest some confederal and protective clauses relat-
ing to protecting Montenegro as the much smaller mem-
ber state. The proposal of the Montenegro Government
(December 2000) in section V, 1 and 3 (para. 3 in both
cases), makes reference to the desirability of each mem-
ber-state having the right to initiate a special protection
procedure in relation to acts of the Assembly or Council
of Ministers. There are precedents for such arrangements
elsewhere which avoid absolute vetoes and deadlocks,
such as the alarm-bell procedure in the Belgian federa-
tion whereby a motion by three-quarters of the members
of one linguistic group in a Federal Legislative Chamber
may raise the alarm that a proposed legislative bill seri-
ously endangers good relations between the two major
communities. This leads to immediate suspension of the
normal parliamentary procedure and instituting of a spe-
cial procedure to resolve the issue. Somewhat similar in
function is Article 2, paras. 7 and 8 in Chapter 1 of the
Rambouillet Accords, 1999 (18-03). These are outlined in
section 5.4.6.1. of our report. We recommend that there
be some such alarm-bell procedure for ensuring the
protection of Montenegros interests as the much smaller
partner. We also suggest that the Canadian precedent
enabling in certain cases opting out arrangements also
be considered. These are also outlined in section 5.4.6.1 of
our report.
(2) In order to protect minorities within each Republic, col-
lective rights of ethnic minority groups should also be
included among the guarantees of basic rights in the fed-
eral constitution.
(3) The financial arrangements within the restructured feder-
ation will need to be clarified. In the official proposal of
the DOS and TFY platform little is specified other than
including the tax system under the mixed powers. That
potentially permits the Federal Government to regulate
the whole framework of the tax system. Experience in
other federations suggests that the financial arrangements
are always contentious and therefore there is a need for
greater clarity and precision, including provision for
exclusive as well as joint taxing powers, for equalization
transfers, and for mechanisms for regular readjustment of
the financial arrangements. The allocation of financial
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resources is important for two reasons: first these
resources enable or constrain governments in the exercise
of their constitutionally assigned legislative and executive
responsibilities, and second, taxing powers and expendi-
tures are themselves important instruments for affecting
and regulating the economy. In relation to the legislative
competencies proposed, the federal governments exclu-
sive revenues might come from customs duties and a tax
on added value (VAT). Some independent taxing powers
should also be identified for the Republics. Each Republic
should in principle have the right to levy taxes sufficient
to perform its constitutional tasks. Remaining taxes
should then be placed in the category of mixed powers
but be left largely to the Republics (see for instance, the
Center for Liberal-Democratic Studies proposal (Belgrade
2000, pages 20-22). Most federations have found it desir-
able to establish a system of equalization transfers to pro-
vide member-states with sufficient revenues to provide
reasonably comparable levels of public service at reason-
ably comparable levels of taxation. Inclusion of this prin-
ciple in the constitution is desirable, although in the inter-
ests of future flexibility detailed formulae for calculation
of such transfers should not be built into the constitution.
All federations have found that the financial arrange-
ments have to be revised regularly because the revenues
provided by particular taxes and the expenditure needs
evolve and change over time. Mechanisms for periodic
modification of the financial arrangements, as exempli-
fied by the periodic independent finance commissions
provided by the constitutions in such countries as Aus-
tralia, India and South Africa, are therefore highly desir-
able.
(4) The joint DOS and TFY Coalition Platform (Sept. 2001)
states simply that the way of electing representatives to the
Chamber of Member States shall fall within the jurisdic-
tion of the member states. While reasonable, that could
lead to considerable difference in the method of electing
them. A number of other proposals have suggested the
desirability of the representation from each member state
being proportional to the representation elected in the
republic parliaments. Some such arrangement may be
desirable if the representation in the Chamber of Member
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States is to represent the range of public opinion in each
member state. Elections to the Chamber of Member States
might occur after each election in a member state with
members holding office until their successors have been
elected after the next election so that there is no period
during which a member state is unrepresented. It should
also be clarified whether members of the federal Chamber
of Member States may at the same time also be members
of the legislature or government of the member state. 
(5) Given the proposal for a bicameral Federal Assembly
composed of a Chamber of Member States representing
the member states, and a Chamber of Citizens expressing
the democratic principle by representing the citizens in
the common state, the provisions for resolving possible
deadlocks between the two chambers need to be spelled
out clearly. Ultimately, to fulfil both the federal and de-
mocratic principles, legislation should require approval
by a majority in each house. However, mechanisms and
procedures for trying to resolve deadlocks would facilitate
effectiveness. An example is the use of mediation commit-
tees as found in a number of federations. 
(6) Also requiring clarification is the relationship of govern-
ments to the Federal Assembly. The DOS and TFY Coali-
tion platform (Sept. 2001) simply states that nonconfi-
dence in the Prime Minister has to be voted by both
chambers of the Assembly. It is not clear whether this
must take the form of a constructive vote of confidence.
This would be a desirable feature. Nor does it state
whether the vote would take place separately in the two
houses, or whether a motion once made in one house
would be resolved in a joint sitting. A different approach
is to establish a fixed term collegial executive on the Swiss
model, as suggested in the Centre for Human Rights
alternative Union proposal, but we would point out that
the effectiveness of that institutional model in Swit-
zerland is coupled with the extensive use of legislative
referendums. Such a radical departure from the current
Yugoslav processes might create more problems than it
would solve. One might also, however, note that the sys-
tem of direct democracy has proven to be a major instru-
ment for conflict management and minority protection
in Switzerland.
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14. The need for change to the constitutional status quo 
We recommend that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in
its current constitutional form not be maintained unless
substantially modified. Although recognized by the internation-
al community, the current FRY has some serious shortcomings.
Its constitutional legitimacy is contested, the constitutional
minority protections are insufficient, and it has provided an
insufficient basis for economic reform. The result has been polit-
ical instability, extensive de facto ignoring of constitutional pro-
visions, and lack of investment and limited economic develop-
ment. It therefore provides a weak base for preparing for mem-
bership in the EU. As a result the status quo is untenable and the
need for constitutional restructuring is clear. 
6.4. CONCLUDING RECOMMENDATION
15. The urgent need for action
We recommend that in view of the urgency and the need to
avoid delay in constitutional restructuring, the President of the
FRY take the initiative to establish a Presidential Commission
with wide representation of the major interests in both politics
and civil society in Yugoslavia, that is both Montenegro and
Serbia, to seek consensus on the procedures for overcoming
the current constitutional problems as quickly as possible.
Political uncertainty and possible instability discourage invest-
ment and foreign aid and become a major barrier to economic
reform and development. Repeated delays in removing political
uncertainty therefore have serious implications for the welfare of
citizens in both Serbia and Montenegro. In our view it is there-
fore essential that the constitutional situation be addressed and
resolved without further delay.
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